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I. Introduction 
Police lying is not best described as a "dirty little secret."' For 
instance, police lying is no "dirtier" than the prosecutor's encouragement 
or conscious use of tailored testimony2 or knowing suppression of Brady 
material;3 it is no more hypocritical than the wink and nod of judges who 
regularly pass on incredible police testimony4 and no more insincere than 
the demagogic politicians who decry criminality in our communities, but 
will not legislate independent monitoring of police wrongd~ing.~ 
1. Morgan Cloud, The Dirty Little Secret, 43 EMORY L.J. 131 1 (1994) (emphasis added). 
2. See Marty I .  Rosenbaum, Inevitable Error Wrongful New York State Honiicide 
Convictions, 1965-1988, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 807, 809 (1990-91); see also 
Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury. and the Heater Factoc An Exclusionary Rule in 
the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U .  COLO. L. REV. 75, 110 (1992) (noting that a former 
Chicago prosecutor described suborning tailored police testimony by instructing police 
witnesses: "if this happens, we win. If this happens, we lose."). 
3. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that "the suppression by the 
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the 
evidence is material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of 
the prosecutionn). 
4. See Cloud, supra note 1, at 1312; Myron W. Orfield. Jr., The Exclrtsio~rary Rule and 
Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Oflcers, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1016, 1023 
(1987) (quoting Donald L. Horowitz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 252, (1977)). An 
account of this refusal to notice police perjury is provided by Alan Dershowitz: 
I have seen trial judges pretend to believe officers whose testimony is contradicted 
by common sense, documentary evidence and even unambiguous tape recordings 
. . . .  Some judges refuse to close their eyes to perjury, but they are the rare 
exception to the rule of blindness, deafness and muteness that guides the vast 
majority of judges and prosecutors. 
Alan N. Dershowitz, Controlling the Cops; Accomplices to Perjury, N.Y. TlhiES, May 2, 1994, 
at A17. 
5. See Leonard Levitt, Police Actions Speak Volumes, NEWSDAY, Oct. 17, 1994 at 20; 
Jonathan P. Hicks, Mayor Vetoes Bill Creating a Panel to Monitor Police, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
24, 1994, at Al ,  A28. 
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Police lying is no "little secret" either.6 Juries, particularly in our 
urban criminal courts, are thoroughly capable of discounting police 
testimony as unbelievable, unreliable, and even .mendacious.' Judges, 
prosecutors and defense attorneys report that police perjury is common- 
place,' and even police officers themselves concede that lying is a regular 
feature of the life of a cop.g Scandals involving police miscon- 
duct-brutality, corruption, criminality-are regularly featured in the daily 
nei~spapers,'~ and periodic investigation reports and blue-ribbon commis- 
6. See Cloud, supra note 1 (emphasis added). 
7. See Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 1037, 1039 (1996); Joe Sexton, Jurors Question Honesty of Police, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 25, 1995 at B3 ("Our prosecutors now have to begin their cases defending the 
cops. Prosecutors have to bring the jury around to the opinion that cops aren't lying. That's 
how much the landscape has changed.") (quoting Michael Vecchione, Kings County Deputy 
District Attorney in charge of trials). See also MILTON MOLLEN, REP. OF THE COMM'N TO 
INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTIONPROC. OF THE 
POLICE DEP'T 39 (July 7, 1994) mereinafter MOLLEN COMM'N REP.]; see also Gabriel J. Chin 
& Scott C. Wells, The "Blue Wall of Silence" as Evidence of Bias and Motive to Lie: A New 
Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U .  PnT. L. REV. 233,250 (1998); David N. Dorfman & Chris 
K. Iijima, Fictions, Fault and Forgiveness: July Null~jication in a New Context, 28 U .  MICH. 
J. LAW R. 861,886 (1995); see generally Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullijication: Black 
Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995). 
8. See Orfield, supra note 2, at 107 (noting that the author's survey study shows that 
Chicago prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys agree that police perjure themselves in 
search and seizure hearings on average 19% of the time; defense attorneys estimate that pe jury 
occurs 53% of the time); see also Irving Younger, The Perjury Routine, THE NATION, May 8, 
1967, 596-97 ("Every lawyer who practices in the criminal courts knows that police perjury is 
commonplace."); H. RICHARD UVILLER, TEMPERED ZEAL: A COLUMBIA LAW PROFESSOR'S 
YEAR ON THE STREETS WITH THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE 116 (1988) (stating that police 
perjury is "prevalen[tIn). It is difficult to measure the amount of lying that occurs: 
We know almost nothing about the testilying "rate," its variations across and within 
police departments, its changes over time, or its etiology. We cannot say what 
percentage of testilies are serious (e.g., the invention of an informant, the 
wholesale manufacture of probable cause) and what proportion are minor (e.g. the 
exaggeration of a suspect's furtive gestures or the politeness of an officer's request 
for consent to search) . . . . Compared with many other offenses, the crime of 
testilying has been poorly measured, and we should be suspicious of claims that its 
incidence is known or its causes understood. 
Kevin R. Reitz, Testilying as a Problem of Crime Control: A Reply to Professor Slobogin, 67 
U. COLO. L. REV 1061, 1062 (1996). 
9. See, e.g., MOLLEN COMM'N REP., supra note 7, at 36; see also Orfield, supra note 4, 
at 1049-50 (revealing that 76% of police in author's study acknowledge that police witnesses 
tailor testimony to prove probable cause to arrest); JONATHAN RUBINSTEIN, CITY POLICE 386- 
88 (1973) (drafting of false police affidavits for search warrants is commonplace). 
10. This type of scandal occurred during the Knapp Commission era. See, e.g., David 
Burnham, City Opens Study of Policing Police, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1970, at Al;  David 
Bumham, Graft Paid to Police Here Said to Run Into Millions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1970 at 
Al.  
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sions come up with the same conclusions: police scandals are cyclical; 
official misconduct, corruption, brutality, and criminality are endemic; and 
necessarily, so is police lying to disguise and deny it." 
The requirements of the Fourth Amendment's proscription against 
unreasonable searches and seizuresI2 and the issue of police credibility 
have been closely linked for forty years of academic discussion and 
study.13 At least from the period following Mapp v. 0hioI4 up to the 
The scandals also were reported during the Mollen Commission era, especially concerning 
Abner Louima's assault. See e.g., David Koczienewski, Rooting Out Rogue Cops, NEWSDAY, 
April 21, 1994, at AS; Dershowitz, supra note 4, at A17; Leonard Levitt, Cracks Appear in 
the Blue Wall of NYPD Silence, NEWDAY, April 21, 1997, at A22; Dan Barry, Charges of 
Brutality: the Overview, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15,1997, at A1; Fred Kaplan, MC Police Accused 
of Pattern of Brutality, BOSTON GLOBE, June 27, 1996, at 8; Joseph D. McNamara, Has the 
Drug War Created an W c e r  Liars' Club?, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1996, at MI. Chin and 
Wells wrote a comprehensive compendium of articles on like subjects. See Chin & Wells, 
supra note 7, at 234-44 nn.2-27. 
11. See generally N.Y.C. COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, BREAKING THE US VS. THEM 
BARRIER: A REP. ON POLICE COMMUNITY RELATIONS (1993); MOLLEN COMM'N REP., supra 
note 7; WARREN CHRISTOPHER, REP. OF THE INDEP. COMhl'N ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP'T 
(1991) [hereinafter CHRISTOPHERCOL~M'N REP.]; WHITMAN KNAPP, REP. OF THE COhlM'N TO 
INVESTIGATEALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE CITY'S ANTI-CORRUPTIONPROC. 
(1972) Dereinafter KNAPP COMM'N REP.]; PRESIDENT'S~OM~~'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND 
ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REP.: THE POLICE (1967); HEARING HELD AT THE U.S. CT. 
HOUSE, FOLEY SQUARE, N.Y., MARCH 14, 1951 BEFORE THE SENATE SPECIAL COhlM. TO 
INVESTIGATE ORGANIZED CRIME IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE (1951); REP. OF SPECIAL 
INVESTIGATIONBY THE DIST. A'IT'Y OF KINGS CO. AND THE DEC. 1949 GRAND JURY; FINAL 
REP. OF SAMUEL SEABURY, REFEREE IN THE M A ~ R  OF THE INVESTIGATION OF THE 
MAGISTRATE'S COURTS IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DEP'T AND THE MAGISTRATES THEREOF, AND 
OF A ~ R N E Y S  AT LAW PRACTICING IN SAID COURTS (1932); NAT'L COhlhl'N ON LAW 
OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT (1931); CHARENCE LEXOW, REP. OF THE SPECIAL COhlhl. 
OF THE BD. OF ALDERMEN OF THE CITY OF N.Y. TO INVESTIGATETHE POLICE DEP'T (1913); 
REP., SPECIAL COMM. APPOINTED TO INVESTIGATETHE POLICE DEP'T OF THE CITY OF N.Y. 
(1895); but see CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, AM. BAR ASS'N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS: 
A REP. TO THE AM. PEOPLE AND THE AM. BAR ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE U.S.: SOhlE 
MYTHS, SOME REALITIES, AND SOME QUESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE (1988) [hereinafter CRIM. 
JUSTICE IN CRISIS] (finding that police dishonesty, perjury, and the judicial acceptance of such 
corrupt practices are not widespread phenomena); Honorable Harold Baer, Jr., The Mollen 
Commission and Beyond, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 5.5-6 (1995) (stating that police corruption 
scandals occur in predictable, "twenty year cyclesn); Richard J. Condon, Police Corruption and 
the Need for Oversight, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 55, 55 (1995) (describing the nature of the 
corruption cycles pre-Knapp Commission). 
12. The Fourth Amendment states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
U.S. CONST., amend. IV. 
13. See e.g., Yale Kamisar, Wolf and Lusrig Ten Years Latec Illegal State Evidence in 
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most recent scholarship and cases on point, there has been a fierce 
controversy on how the procedural requirements placed on police conduct 
encourage police lying and duplicity in order to tailor the facts to these 
legal requisites.I5 Specifically, scholars, judges, pundits, and law 
enforcement professionals argue back and forth on whether or not the 
exclusion of illegally obtained evidence actually deters police misconduct, 
or rather encourages police perjury and "scamming," while rewarding 
undeserving criminal offenders.16 
This essay proposes a wider scope for a somewhat timeworn 
discussion-specifically, that police mendacity and the need to deter this 
form of police misconduct go to the very heart of our criminal justice 
State and Federal Courts, 43 MINN. L. REV. 1083 (1959); Sarah Barlow, Patterns of Arrests 
for Misdemeanor Narcotics Possession: Manhattan Police Practices 1960-62.4 CRIM. L. BULL. 
549, 549-50 (1968) (setting forth a study that "dropsy" testimony- police testimony that a 
suspect had dropped drugs in plain view of the arresting officer- was much more prevalent 
after the High Court's holding in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), which first interposed 
the exclusionary rule in state search and seizure cases). In Barlow's article, the author opined 
that police witnesses were committing pe jury to tailor the facts to avoid evidentiary exclusion. 
See id. See also Younger, supra note 8 (describing the dropsy phenomena from the bench in 
New York City's criminal courts); Orfield, supra note 4, at 97; Fred Cohen, Police Perjury: 
An Interview with Martin Garbus, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 363, 367 (1972) (describing patterns of 
police pe jury). 
14. 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that all evidence obtained unconstitutionally is 
inadmissible in state court). 
15. See, e.g., Harry M .  Caldwell & Carol A. Chase, The Unruly Exclusionary Rule: 
Heeding Justice Blackmun's Call to Examamrne the Rule in Light of Changing Judicial 
Understanding About its Effects Outside the Courtroom, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 45, 52-53 (1994); 
Robert P. Bums, Bright Lines and Hard Edges: Anatomy of a Criminal Evidence Decision, 85 
J. CRIM. L. & CRlMINOLOGY 843 (1995); Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth 
Amendment is Worse than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1994); Donald A. Dripps, 
Police, Plus Perjury Equals Polygraphy, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 693 (1996); Cloud, 
supra note 1; William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 
881 (1991). 
16. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974) (defining the purpose 
of excluding illegally obtained evidence from trial as to deter future police misconduct). But 
see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 911-913 (1984) (stating that the costs of excluding 
inculpatory proof outweighs the deterrent value when police officers reasonably rely on 
defective warrant papers); see generally Slobogin, supra note 7; AKHIL REED AMAR, THE 
CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 1-45 (1997); JUDGE HAROLD 
J. ROTHWAX, GUILTY: THE COLLAPSE OF CRIMINAL JUSnCE 35-65 (1996); Jerome Skolnick, 
Deception by Police, 1 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, 40,43 (1982) (saying the officer "lies because he 
is skeptical of a system that suppresses truth in the interest of the criminaln); McNamara, supra 
note 10, at M1 (reporting that former police chiefs in both Kansas city and San Jose have 
"come to believe that hundreds of thousands of law enforcement officers commit felony perjury 
every year testifying about drug arrestsn). 
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system and the need for trust in government and its proce~ses,'~ of which 
search and seizure law and practice is only a small part. Being only a part 
of a much larger systemic k d  societal problem, tinkering with search and 
seizure law and process alone will not heighten the police witness' respect 
for the oath.'' 
Police officers can be expected to omit, redact, and even lie on their 
police reports, sworn or ~nswvorn;'~ they will conceal or misrepresent to 
cover up corruptionz0 and brutality;'' they are trained to deceive citizens 
during investigations as part of good police practice;22 they will obscure 
17. See SlSSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE, 26-27 
(1978) ("Trust is a social good to be protected just as much as the air we breathe or the water 
we drink. When it is damaged, the community as a whole suffers; and when it is destroyed, 
societies falter and collapse."). Morgan Cloud states the need for trust in police officers: 
As the only representatives of the criminal justice system that most citizens see in 
everyday life, police officers serve important symbolic functions, and the entire 
society suffers if their behavior violates the rule of lawv. In a more concrete 
dimension, police officers are the agents of the state licensed to use force--deadly 
force if necessary-to implement the law's constraints upon our behavior. They 
are often the most important government actors in the process of deciding who will 
remain free and who will not. It is appropriate that we demand that the members 
of our democracy who possess this kind of power obey the system of laws that 
creates their power. 
Morgan Cloud, Judges, "Testilying, " and the Constitution, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1341, 1354-55 
(1996). 
18. See Dripps, supra note 15, at 693 ("Police perjury, if accepted, can defeat any 
constitutional rule. Thus, the debates about stop-and-frisk, automobile searches, and police 
interrogation have a scholastic quality; no matter what rule appellate courts adopt, police may 
circumvent that rule by persuading trial courts to accept an incorrect account of the facts."). 
19. See generally Stanley Z .  Fisher, "Just the Facts, Ma'am": Lying and the Ontission 
of Exculpatory Evidence in Police Reports, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1 (1993) (giving examples 
of garden variety "reportilying"). James Lardner gave colorful examples of reportilying. St?e 
JAMES LARDNER, CRUSADER: THE HELL-RAISING POLICE CAREER OF DETECTIVE DAVID 
DURK (1996). One describes a patrolman who apprehended a burglar and was instructed by 
the Sergeant to place the Sergeant at the scene of the arrest in patrolman's paperwork; "put me 
in at the collar," officers would instruct subordinates. Id. at 31. Another discussed a police 
officer who rigged police papervrork in order to sabotage prosecution of a gambler who had 
been paying off the Department's Plainclothes Division. See id. at 107. A final example WiIS 
the Special Investigations Unit detectives who were paid up to $50,000 to destroy the records 
of an unauthorized wiretap and sabotage the case against defendants in Narcotics cases. See 
id. at 144. 
20. See generally, KNAPP COMM'N REP., supra note 11; LARDNER, supra note 19; ALLAN 
KORNBLUM, THE MORAL HAZARDS: POLICE STRATEGIES FOR HONESTY AND ETHICAL 
BEHAVIOR 15-46 (1967) (containing a particularly detailed discussion of police deception and 
dishonesty in the enforcement of N.Y.'s gambling laws). 
21. See generally PAUL G. CHEVIGNY, POLICE POWER: POLICE ABUSES IN NEVI YORK 
CITY (1969); see also CHRISTOPHERCOMM'N REP., supra note 11. at 168; MOLLEN COMM'N 
REP., supra note 7, at 53-58; David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can the Violence be Contained?, 
27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 465,481 (1992); Joel Berger, See-No-Evil Oflcers Sltould Pay, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1997, at 13. 
22. See generally Deborah Young, Unnecessary Evil: Police Lying in Interrogations, 28 
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facts, and even lie, to cover up the misconduct of fellow officers." 
Additionally, command practice and policy gives officers every incentive 
to lie to cover for lack of productivity or to aggrandize themselves for 
recognition and promotion.24 And yes, police officers will commit 
perjury in our courts of law." 
However, lies under oath, while often involving the tailoring of 
testimony to meet constitutional requirements, run a much wider gamut. 
For instance, perjury will occur to avoid criminal conviction or civil 
liability when the police officer is the accused.26 Police will commit 
perjury to further the prosecution of a citizen by adding inculpatory 
"evidence" to better secure a conviction," to gild the lily of police 
conduct,28 or merely to sanitize the record of uncomfortable facts.29 Put 
most broadly, as long as a police officer's use of power and fulfillment of 
responsibilities is reviewed (whether by courts, government agencies or 
supervisors), and as long as such reviews are deemed by the officer as 
creating legal impediments to more immediate goals, he will have an 
incentive to lie.30 
None of the incentives and pressures for police officers to lie can be 
properly distinguished from the reasons many other citizens have to falsify. 
Police stand here in the august company of politicians, professionals, public 
CONN. L. REV. 425 (1996); Skolnick, supra note 16; YALE KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION 
AND CONFESSIONS (1980). 
23. See C h i  & Wells, supra note 7 (discussing the effects of the "blue wall of silence" 
in covering up police misconduct). 
24. See Fisher, supra note 19, at 12-14. 
25. See, e.g., MOLLEN COMM'N REP., supra note 7, at 36; see also Orfield, supra note 
4, at 1049-50; JONATHAN RUBINSTEIN, CITY POLICE 386-88 (1973). 
26. See generally CHEVIGNY, supra note 21; Chin & Wells, supra note 7, at 277-79; 
Joseph Berger, A False Report.. Racial Issues and OfJicers Lose Their Jobs, N.Y. TIMES Apr. 
24, 1993 at 1, 26. 
27. See Fisher, supra note 19, at 2-3 (describing police reports in Jones v. City of 
Chicago, 856 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1988), that were filled with falsehoods in order to make a 
stronger case against a suspect). 
28. See LARDNER, supra note 19, at 31; KORNBLUM, supra note 20, at 80 (describing the 
practice of "flakingn-officers planting contraband on suspects to make high arrest quotas). 
29. See Fisher, supra note 19, at 8-9 (explaining that police will reportily by excising 
exculpatory facts which might expose the officer to civil liability for false arrest or embarrass- 
ment for bad policing); see generally CHEVIGNY, supra note 21 (defining "cover chargesn as 
false charges of disorderly conduct or resisting arrest or assault in order to cover for the injuries 
suffered by the defendant at the hands of the police). 
30. See Skolnick, supra note 16, at 42 ("[Plerjury represents a subcultural norm rather 
than an individual aberration"); id. at 43 ("The policeman lies because lying becomes a routine 
way of managing legal impediments-whether to protect fellow officers or to compensate for 
what he views as limitations the courts have placed on his capacity to deal with criminals."). 
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figures, business executives and other persons of power and responsibility, 
all of whom have strong incentives to conceal uncomfortable circumstanc- 
es, inflate favorable ones, and invent if necessary where no such happy 
facts exist.31 
What distinguishes police officers is their unique power-to use force, 
to summarily deprive a citizen of freedom, to even use deadly force, if 
necessary--and their commensurately unique responsibilities-to be the 
living embodiment of the "law" in our communities, as applied Edirly to 
every member." History, both in our country33 and else~here,3~ 
teaches us that the powers to use force and to arrest are ones we must 
watch closely, even jealously. We know all too well the record of terrible 
abuse. We also know that the responsibility of public officials to represent 
hir  and equal treatment is a bedrock of public trust, from which tve derive 
the necessary confidence to live peaceably in a complex society.35 
All that said, eliminating the exclusionary rule for illegally obtained 
evidence36 or changing the manner in which we hold suppression hear- 
31. It is instructive here to compare the travails of President Clinton, who has admitted to 
misleading statements and testimony in the Paula Jones sexual harassment case, and the situation 
of the lying police officer in a garden variety criminal case. Both the President and the officer 
rationalize deception by adherence to a skeptical view both of the system and of the opposition. 
Both their statements are the products of extreme partisanship. 
For example, President Clinton believed that both the Independent Counsel's office and 
the Jones attorneys were compt  and politically motivated, entitling him to make less than 
candid statements in deposition testimony, in the Grand Jury, and to the American public. 
President Clinton believed that both the Independent Counsel and the Jones attorneys were using 
allegations of sexual impropriety against him to drive him from ofice and further a right-wing 
political agenda. 
The lying police officer believes that the laws of search and seizure and the internal 
regulations and administration of police conduct are unreasonable and decidedly wrong-headed, 
the product of a liberal political and social agenda. He believes with certainty that the 
defendant he has arrested is a criminal deserving conviction and punishment, whose defense 
(whether procedural or substantive) is, by definition, corrupt. That is, the defense posture of 
a criminal is necessarily an attempt to escape proper punishment, and is therefore, by definition, 
immoral. The officer's contempt for the system that (in his mind) unreasonably impedes law 
enforcement and wrongheadedly protects the criminal, and his greater contempt for the 
defendant seeking to foil justice by mounting a defense, justifies his deception. In the officer's 
mind, the lie serves a greater good. 
32. See Cloud. supra note 17, at 1354-55. 
33. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENTIN AMERICAN HISTORY 152- 
55,360-63 (1993); JEROME K. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND 
THE EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE 23-88 (1993). 
34. See generally MAURICE PUNCH, CONDUCT UNBECOMING (1985); CLIFFORD D. 
SHEARING, ORGANIZATIONAL POLICE DEVIANCE (1981); PAUL CHEVIGNY, EDGE OF THE 
KNIFE: POLICE VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAS (1995). 
35. See BOK, supra note 17, at 26-27. 
36. See Slobogin, supra note 7. at 1057-59; see generally Robert P .  Davidow, Criminal 
Procedure Ombudsman Revisited, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 939 (1982); AMAR, supra 
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ings?' would be largely ineffectual in combating the problem of police 
di~honesty.~~ The Fourth Amendment isn't a tool to combat police 
perjury, but rather targets unconstitutional conduct.39 
Moreover, the Fourth Amendment can't be a comprehensive tool to 
combat perjury when lying under oath in search and seizure hearings is just 
a smaller subset of the greater category of police falsification. The scope 
of the problem of police dishonesty, its causes, and our attempts to remedy 
it far exceed the compass of the Fourth Amendment.40 
On the other hand, we do have tools available to fight (or at least 
reveal) lying in the courtroom, and some of the casual falsehoods that lead 
up to it. These tools are familiar ones to trial lawyers and trial judg- 
es-constitutionally compelled, statutorily required, and judicially ordered 
discovery;41 a real opportunity for thorough cross-e~arnination;~~ and the 
note 16; ROTHW.%X, supra note 16. 
37. See Cloud, supra note 1, at 1344-48 (proposing to expand the warrant requirement to 
all nonexigent searches and seizures while narrowing the exigency exception); Dripps, supra 
note 15, at 703-16 (proposing to admit polygraph evidence of both the testifying police officer 
and the defendant to help determine witness credibility in a suppression hearing); Slobogin, 
supra note 7, at 1055-57 (proposing to "flexifyn probable cause by making it a more "common 
sensen judgment which incorporates the experience of the police officer); see also Christopher 
Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1, 29-33 (1991) 
(proposing to make the suspicion requirements for police intrusion proportional to the level of 
intrusion being challenged); AMAR, supra note 16, at 31-45 (proposing to detach the court's 
determination of the "constitutional reasonablenessn of a search or seizure from the warrant 
requirement or the probable cause standard). 
38. See Stuntz, supra note 15, at 919 (asserting that warrant requirements do not prevent 
police perjury, but rather keep after-the-fact results from influencing judges). Dripps also 
expressed reservations about procedural solutions: 
Police willing to lie can lie not only about exigent circumstances but also about 
consent and abandonment. 'Objective facts' depend on what testimony is believed 
at the suppression hearing . . . . [IJn the end, I am skeptical about letting the 
procedural tail wag the substantive dog. At the least we should artificially interpret 
the [Clonstitution to protect its true meanings from police perjury only as a last 
resort, with reluctance and regret. 
Dripps, supra note 15, at 702. 
39. See United States v. Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210,215 (3rd Cir. 1987). 
40. See generally Skolnick, supra note 16. 
41. The Federal Constitution provides a basis for ordered discovery under the Due Process 
Clause. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (explaining that the prosecutor has duty 
to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense, i.e., evidence "material either to guilt or 
punishmentn); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (describing Brady evidence as 
"materialn if there is a "reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the 
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been differentn). State constitutions can also 
provide for protection under due process. See, e.g., People v. Vilardi, 555 N.E.2d 915 (1990) 
(adopting more protective Agurs standard of materiality-whether there was reasonable 
possibility that nondisclosure "contributed to the verdictn) (referring to United States v. Agurs, 
427 U.S. 97 (1976)). The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure set the scope of statutorily 
mandated discovery. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16; FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2. For discretionary 
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elevation of the issue of witness credibility to the prominence it truly 
deserves.43 In other words, upon a sufficient offer of proof, criminal 
court judges should permit full-dress litigation of police credibility. 
Judges should encourage a much deeper exploration of the issue of police 
credibility than presently occurs in our criminal courts. 
In that connection, Part 11 of this article analyzes first the functional, 
political, procedural, and doctrinal reasons why criminal court judges do 
not now weigh police witness credibility seriously. Part III sets forth 
different scholarly approaches from the literature to the problem of police 
mendacity and various proposed institutional and legal reforms to address 
disclosure, see the Rule 7 provisions regarding a Bill of Particulars. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 
7. Compare FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 and FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2 with N.Y. CRIM. PROC. 200.95 
(McKimey 1993) (providing an example of state criminal procedure law and providing that 
upon defense request, state must provide a Bill of Particulars) and N.Y. CRIM. PROC. 240.20 
(McKimey 1993) (requiring that upon defense demand, the State must produce and make 
available various documents, property, photos, etc.). There is inherent judicial authority to 
extend discovery beyond that which is authorized by the Federal Rules. See United States v.  
Carrigan, 804 F.2d 599 (10th Cir. 1986) (giving the court inherent authority to order 
government witnesses to submit to defense depositions as a sanction for government 
misconduct); see also United State v. Stubblefield, 325 F. Supp. 485 (E.D. Tenn. 1971); 
compare id., with N.Y. CRIM. PROC. 240.40 (l)(c) (McKimey 1993) (providing that upon 
defense motion, a court may in its discretion order discovery of any property which the 
defendant can show is material to the preparation of his defense). 
42. The right of confrontation is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the Federal 
Constitution, providing the accused's right to the oppormnity of cross-examination of witnesses 
in criminal proceedings: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . 
to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST., amend. VI. Similarly worded 
confrontation clauses in state constitutions and bills of rights have also been held to guarantee 
cross-examination of witnesses. See e.g., N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS !j 12 (McKinney 1992). 
The Federal Rules of Evidence under Rule 6110) contemplates cross examination of 
witnesses on "matters affecting the credibility of the witness." FED. R. EVID. 6110). Judges 
have substantial discretion regarding the proper scope of such cross-examination. In addition, 
Rule 801(c) defines hearsay as inadmissible out-of-court statements offered to "prove the truth 
of the matter asserted," thus not precluding out-of-court statements offered in cross-examination 
to challenge a witness' credibility (e.g., prior inconsistent statements; statements tending to 
prove bias, hostility or self-interest; proof of prior bad acts or crimes relevant to the witness' 
credibility). FED. R. EVID. 801(c). Thus, hearsay and the limits of the hearsay exclusion 
permit cross-examination of witnesses so long as out-of-court statements and proof introduced 
bear on the witness' believability and reliability. 
43. See generally H. Richard Uviller, Credence, Character and the Rules of Evidence: 
Seeing Through the Liar's Tale. 42 DUKE L.J. 776 (1993). Uviller describes an adversary trial 
as 
a structured process for the determination of the credibility of strangers, many of 
whom will, for one reason or another, try to deceive those who rely upon their 
word. Our faith in the adversary system-still a significant element in the 
determination of guilt--depends in large measure on our confidence that, assisted 
by courtroom procedure, our jurors will usually return a verdict consistent with the 
historical fact. 
Id. 
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it. In that section, the strengths, flaws, and practical limitations of each of 
these proposals are explored. Lastly, Part IV of this article sets forth a 
judicial approach (if not a solution) to the problem of police lying. It 
explores familiar evidentiary and procedural means by which judges can 
provide a fuller hearing of the issue of police witness credibility. By these 
means, criminal trials conducted under accepted rules of evidence and 
process can reveal the lie and (perhaps) deter it. 
Judges who have been giving the wink and nod to questionable police 
testimony, who have been working with an improper (and frankly illegal) 
presumption in favor of police witness ~redibility,~~ must change both 
practice and perspective. One of the strongest reasons that police lie in 
court is the simple fact that judges allow them to get away with it. The 
wink and the nod conveys many messages-either that the judge is 
politically hamstrung and so cannot afford to confront the lie;4s or that the 
judge defers to the police witness, knowing that confronting the lie aids the 
defen~e;"~ or most disturbingly, that the judge actually approves of the lie. 
In any event, nothing less than an utter change in judicial conduct and point 
of view, free of political pressure to be "tough on crime," will result in the 
most effective deterrent to police lying. 
Surely, other changes in the government's approach to police 
misconduct need to be effected as well-better monitoring of departmental 
performance by civilian agencies;47 upgraded hiring practices, training, 
internal m~ni tor ing;~~ and so on-but such reforms are beyond the scope 
of this article. Nevertheless, as part of a larger legal and institutional 
44. See Cloud, supra note 1, at 1339-40. 
45. See Cloud, supra note 17, at 1347-50; John Q. Barrett, The Voices and Groups That 
Will Preserve (What We Can Preserve on Judicial Independence, 12 ST. JOHNS J.L. COMMENT. 
1 (1996). Cloud and Barrett discuss United States v. Bayless [1], 913 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996), a case where Federal District Court Judge Harold Baer, Jr. suppressed 80 pounds of 
narcotics discovered in the trunk of the defendant's car based in part on the judge's discrediting 
of police witness testimony, and United States v. Bayless [11l, 921 F .  Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996), where after months of political fallout and calls for the Judge's impeachment, Judge Baer 
re-opened the suppression hearing and reversed his prior ruling, denying the defense's motion 
to suppress while now accrediting the police testimony. See Cloud, supra note 17, at 1346-50; 
Barrett, supra note 45. 
46. See Cloud, supra note 1, at 1321-24. 
47. See MOLLEN COMM'N REP., supra note 7, at 152; see generally Annette Gordon-Reed, 
Watching the Protectors: Independent Oversight of Municipal Law Enforcement Agencies, 40 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 87 (1995); Peter F. Vallone, The City Council's View of Independent 
Oversight of the Police Department, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 13 (1995); Paul A. Crotty, The 
Corporation Counsel's View of Independent Oversight of the Police Department, 40 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 23 (1995); Richard 1. Condon, Police Corruption and the Need For Oversight, 
40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 55 (1995). 
48. See William I. Bratton, Fighting Police Corruption as Crime Itself, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. 
L. REV. 35 (1995); SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 33, at 172-266. 
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reformation, the judiciary can begin to change its own practice of giving 
a wide berth to police dishonesty as a first step in solving a fundamental 
problem in our justice system and police culture. The judiciary can stop 
winking and nodding, and instead subject police witnesses to the same tests 
of proof that other witnesses are subjected to when they swear to tell the 
truth. 
11. The Judicial Weighing of Police Credibility 
A. The Diminished Seriousness of Weighing Wtness Credibility 
Despite the historical and jurisprudential separation of the roles of 
judge and jury-the judge as the arbiter of the law and the jury as the 
arbiter of the fact~~~-the judge in criminal cases is often called upon to 
be a factfinder. A mere sampling of the occasions when a criminal court 
judge must determine and weigh facts includes: when a judge rules on the 
credibility and sufficiency of evidence presented at a preliminary hear- 
ing,50 when a judge must make an evidentiary ruling (often during trial) 
regarding the credibility and admissibility of evidence based on a offer of 
proof,5' when a judge must determine both relevance and degree of 
probativeness when expanding (or limiting) the scope of discovery (or 
when deciding on whether to sign a subpoena or compel testirn0ny),5~ 
49. See United States v. Battiste, 24 F. Cas. 1042 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835) (No. 14,545) 
(providing one of the earliest formulations of this division). Justice Story, presiding at trial as 
a Circuit Justice, instructed the Massachusetts jury: 
It is the most sacred constitutional right of every party accused of a crime, that the 
jury should respond as to the facts, and the court as to the law. It is the duty of 
the court to instruct the jury as to the law; and it is the duty of the jury to follow 
the law, as it is laid down by the court. 
Id. at 1043. 
50. See Thies v. State, 189 N.W. 539, 541 (1922). In Thies, the court states: 
The object or purpose of the preliminary Fearing] is to prevent hasty, malicious, 
improvident, and oppressive prosecutions, to protect the person charged from open 
and public accusations of crime, to avoid both for the defendant and the public the 
expense of a public trial, and to save the defendant from the humiliation and 
anxiety involved in public prosecution, and to discover whether or not there are 
substantial grounds upon which a prosecution may be based. 
Id. 
51. See FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(2); FED. R. EVID. 103(c). 
52. See FED. R. CRIhf. P. 16 (concerning discovery and inspection); FED. R. C R I ~ ~ .  PRO.
17 (subpoena); 18 U.S.C. 6003 (compulsion of testimony by grant of immunity). Compare id., 
with N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 240 (McKinney 2000) (discovery); N.Y. CRIhl. PRoC. $ 610 
(McKinney 2000) (subpoena); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. 5 50 (McKinney 2000) (compulsion of 
evidence by offer of immunity). 
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when a judge must decide whether or not sufficient credible evidence has 
been presented to require a judicial instruction to the j u d 3  when a judge 
determines whether sufficient facts have been presented to support a 
criminal information or a true bill of indictmentYs4 when a judge entertains 
an application for bail conditions and thus must review (among other 
considerations) the strength of the prosecution's case and the strength of the 
defense,'5 and of course when a judge is the ultimate finder of fact during 
a bench 
For a factfinder in any legal posture, the issue of credibility-the 
believability and reliability of testimonial evidence-is absolutely para- 
mount. A factfinder must: 
scrutinize the testimony given and the circumstances under which each 
witness has testified . . . . [clonsider each witness' intelligence, his 
motives, state of mind, his demeanor and manner whiie on the witness 
stand . . . . All evidence of a witness whose self-interest is shown from 
either benefits received, detriments suffered, threats or promises made, 
or any attitude of the witness which might tend to prompt testimony 
either favorable or unfavorable to the accused should be considered with 
caution and weighed with care." 
There is nothing stated expressly in the law that this enterprise of 
scrutinizing testimony is any less important for a judge than for a jury. 
However, the legal posture in which criminal court judges normally find 
facts serve to relieve judges from taking the weighing of witness credibility 
as seriously as would otherwise be indicated. First of all, judges (unlike 
juries) know that determinations of credibility are reviewed on appeal only 
for an abuse of d i scre t i~n .~~ The crediting or discrediting of testimony 
is almost never "clear error."59 To that extent, judges do not experience 
the same fear of committing reversible error when weighing the accuracy 
53. For instance, see the evidentiary standard set forth in People v. Taylor, 80 N.Y.2d 1 
(1992) (stating the court must initially determine that a reasonable view of the evidence supports 
a finding of a defense before such defense may be submitted by instruction to the jury). 
54. See FED. R. CRIM. P 12(b)(2) (contemplating pre-trial motions to dismiss a defective 
indictment or information); compare id. with N.Y. CRIM. PROC. 3 170.50(l)(a) (McKinney 
1993) (providing a more detailed provision than the federal mles and providing that the 
prosecutor's information may be dismissed if evidence was legally insufficient to support the 
charge) and N.Y. CRIM. PROC. 5 210.30 (McKinney 1993) (allowing the indictment to be 
dismissed or charges reduced if evidence before the grand jury was legally insufficient). 
55. See 18 U.S.C. 3142(g) (listing factors the court must consider when ordering terms 
for bail); compare id., with N.Y. CRIM. PROC. 3 510.30(2) (McKinney 1995). 
56. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 23 (allowing trials before the court when the defendant waives 
the right to a jury trial); compare id., with N.Y. CRIM. PROC. 3 350.20 (McKinney 1994). 
57. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 312 n.14 (1966). 
58. See Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1975). 
59. See id. at 575. 
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and believability of testimony, as opposed to when making the correct 
ruling on a matter of law. 
In addition, judges in criminal cases are cast in the role of factfinders 
during pre-trial suppression hearings. The standard of proof in a hearing 
regarding probable cause to search or the potential taint of an identification 
procedure is the civil standard of a "preponderance of credible evidence," 
rather than the standard for criminal trials of "beyond a reasonable 
Therefore, even if a question of credibility is raised during a 
pre-trial suppression hearing, the prosecution must show only that its 
version of the facts is more likely than not, a standard that invites, at most, 
mild judicial ~crutiny.~' If the prosecution's burden at a pre-trial hearing 
was to prove the credibility of its witnesses beyond a reasonable doubt in 
order to prove probable cause to search, no doubt the judge-as-factfinder 
would feel constrained to scrutinize the witness' reliability more carefully. 
This relaxation of the rules of witness credibility for fact-finding 
judges applies not only during suppression hearings, but in other kinds of 
evidentiary rulings as well. For instance, error may not be predicated 
upon a ruling which admits or excludes any evidence unless a substantial 
right of the party is effe~ted.~' Appellate courts have come to interpret 
this to mean that "garden variety" evidentiary rulings are (presumptively) 
non-reviewable or at worst harmless error.63 Certainly, evidentiary rulings 
based on preliminary factfinding and the weighing of witness credibility 
(again, subject only to an "abuse of discretion" standard of review) are de 
facto non-reviewable. 
Lastly, a judge is particularly free to weigh testimony and its legal 
significance when presiding at a bench trial, that is, when the judge serves 
60. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 (1974). 
61. The most telling case on point is People v. McMurtry. 314 N.Y.S.2d 194 (Crim. Ct. 
1970). In that case, Judge Irving Younger discussed the problem of constitutionally tailored 
testimony particularly in narcotics cases. See id. Judge Younger described what is termed 
"dropsyn testimony, where police witnesses allege that the defendant dropped narcotics on the 
floor or sidewalk in plain view of the arresting officer, affording the officer probable cause to 
arrest. See id. at 197. The court determined that "'dropsy' testimony should be scmtinized 
with especial caution." Id. Judge Younger reasoned: "When there are grounds for believing 
that the 'guardians of its security' sometimes give deliberately false testimony, it is no 'dismal 
reflection on society' for judges to acknowledge what all can see." Id. 
Ironically, Judge Younger did not suppress the evidence in the McMurtry case, finding 
that the officer's testimony did not appear to be false, nor was their any contradiction from 
other witness' testimony. See id. at 198. Accordingly, Judge Younger relied on whether the 
civil standard of proof had been met, judging that the movant (defendant) did not prevail 
because in a case where the testimony was evenly balanced, the prosecution vrins. See id. The 
point of diminished seriousness could not be better illustrated. 
62. See FED. R. EVID. 103(a). 
63. See, e.g., United States v. Traylor. 656 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1981); see ako FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 52 (regarding harmless error, i.e., when defect "does not affect substantial rights"). 
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as both the arbiter of the law and the facts.@ Police officers often waive 
their right to a jury trial and opt for a bench trial when they themselves are 
charged as defendants (for example, in brutality cases or corruption cases), 
in part because they assume that a judge, more than a jury of citizens, will 
sympathize with them as defendants and believe them as witnesses. This 
sympathy for police defendants and police witnesses can result in "judge 
nullification," and an undeserved acquittal for the police offi- 
~erldefendant.~~ Most significantly, a judge's judgment of acquittal, like 
a jury's, is non-reviewable.& 
Thus, given the legal posture of the criminal court judge as factfinder, 
the review of witness credibility becomes a matter of diminished serious- 
ness. What this author means by diminished seriousness is that a judge 
who is bound by clear rules of law (or specific factors to consider), subject 
to appellate review, is a judge held to a standard of serious review. To the 
extent that a judge is given something approaching unfettered discretion, 
largely unreviewable by an appellate court (for example, to the degree that 
no ruling on witness credibility can be clear error), is the extent to which 
the system expresses its lack of serious concern over the entire issue. 
B. The Further Diminished Seriousness of Weighing Police mtness 
Testimony 
As an institutional and political matter, this lack of scrutiny of witness 
credibility by judges-as-factfinders is compounded when the witness 
involved is a police officer. In criminal cases, much evidence is premised 
on police testimony. In pre-trial suppression hearings in particular, 
evidence is comprised largely of police accounts, specifically the police 
officer or informant who hears of or observes facts that would constitute 
grounds for police intrusion or seizure, the police officer who actually 
commits the intrusion or the seizure, the interrogating police officer, or the 
officer who witnesses a defendant's statement, or the police officer who 
witnesses or conducts an identification procedure. In cases of searches or 
arrests pursuant to a warrant, there may be additional witnesses, including 
the officer who heard certain information from an informant and the officer 
who actually authored the warrant affidavit.67 
64. See supra note 56. 
65. See Rob Yale, Note: Searching For the Consequences of Police Brutality. 70 S .  CAL. 
L. REV. 1841, 1846-48 (1997) (finding that courts are loath to impose criminal sanctions on 
police since they are professionals with their own standards and rules that judges will not 
second-guess); Cf. SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 33, at 195-99. 
66. See Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54 (1978) (stating that the double jeopardy 
clause does not distinguish between jury and non-jury trials). 
67. See People v. Hetrick, 80 N.Y.2d 344 (1992); Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 
Heinonline - -  26 Am. J. Crim. L. 469 1998-1999 
Sometimes the relevant testimony comes from one police witness. 
Other times, particularly when team investigative activity (such as, 
narcotics "buy-and-busts") are involved, testimony will come from a large 
number of police witnesses, for example, an observing officer, an arresting 
officer, an undercover officer, a supervising officer, an officer assigned to 
seize and voucher evidence, and so forth.68 
When a judge suppresses evidence because of a constitutional violation 
by the police, there are a number of consequences. The primary one is 
that inculpatory proof is excluded from the In some cases, this 
will require the dismissal of some if not all charges against the defen- 
dant.70 In those same cases, this will entitle an otherwise guilty defendant 
to go free or face a sharply reduced sentence, if convicted. 
As a consequence of such suppression, the judge is necessarily ruling 
on the conduct of the police officers, on their credibility at times and on 
the performance and competence of the prosecution. A trial judge or 
appellate court can couch this ruling in any number of ways-that the 
police conduct was an intentional if not flagrant violation of criminal 
procedure of a constitutional dimension71 or that the police testimony 
describing such conduct was unworthy of belief." However, a scathing 
(1978). 
68. For a helpful description of a buy-and-bust operation, see JEROME H. SKOLNICK & 
DAVID BAYLEY, THE NEW BLUE LINE: POLICE INNOVATION IN SIX AMERICAN CITIES 172-75 
(1986). 
69. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that all evidence obtained 
unconstitutionally is inadmissible in state court via the incorporation of the Fourth Amendment 
into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Weeks v. United States, 
232 U.S. 383 (1914) (finding that in a federal prosecution, the Fourth Amendment bars 
evidence obtained via an illegal search and seizure). 
70. See Justice Cardozo's famous opinion in People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585 (1926) 
(stating that under the exclusionary doctrine of the New York State Constitution, "[tlhe criminal 
is to go free because the constable has blunderedn). 
71. For instance, the Supreme Court in McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948) 
held that a warrantless search of a rooming house was constitutionally invalid. See id. at 454- 
55. The police officers' intentional breach of the warrant requirement (i.e., they had been 
previously denied a warrant) was deemed outrageous: "[plower is a heady thing; and history 
shows that police acting on their own cannot be trusted." Id. at 456. Harris also provides an 
example. People v. Hams, 532 N.E.2d 1229 (1988). rev'd, 495 U.S. 14 (1990), on remand, 
570 N.E.2d 1051 (1991). With respect to the purpose and flagrancy of the unlav/ful entry, the 
New York State Court of Appeals found that the police had probable cause to arrest for five 
days, but deliberately chose not to obtain a warrant. See id. at 1233. Accordingly, admission 
of the defendant's statement made after the unlawful entry would encourage violations of the 
warrant requirement and a routine departmental policy to forego arrest warrants. See id. at 
1233-35. 
72. See, e.g., People v. Heath, 214 A.2d 519,520-21 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (stating that 
police "testimony that he observed defendant exchanging a 2-inch glass vial with a dark top, 
from a distance of approximately 74 feet, from a moving patrol car, after dark, is, in our view, 
contrary to common experience and, as such, was incredible as a matter of law and did not 
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opinion impugning the motives, honesty, or competency of police is rarely 
found in trial court opinions.73 More likely, a trial judge even when 
finding against the prosecution, will characterize the police conduct as a 
negligent, if not merely technical, violation that the judge is constrained to 
find in breach.74 Sometimes the trial judge will rule in the most neutral 
manner of all-merely that the prosecution has failed to sustain its burden 
to prove that the police conduct was constitutional. 
However, it should be no surprise that the criminal court judge will 
much more likely find for the prosecution in a suppression hearing and 
admit the state's evidence.75 That strong tendency to find in favor of the 
- ~~ 
support the verdict"); United States v. Mitchell, 83 F. Supp. 1073, 1079 (N.D. Miss. 1993) 
(finding that a police officer's testimony that he could "plainly feel" crack cocaine contained 
in six plastic bags, wrapped in a sock which was contained in a brown paper bag carried in the 
pocket of a leather jacket was not credible, i.e., determination of narcotics contraband was not 
"within the realm of human capability with a single pass of one's hand over the outer 
clothingn). C' Judge Lance Ito's finding that L.A.P.D. investigators demonstrated a "reckless 
disregard for the truth" in a warrant application to search the house of O.J. Simpson, but the 
court nevertheless did not suppress any evidence obtained therein. For helpful discussion, see 
Slobogin, supra note 7, at 1037-38. 
73. But see United States v. Bayless 0 , 9 1 3  F.Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (showing the 
exception that proves the rule). In Bayless (I), the court states: 
. . . Officer Carroll's testimony is at best suspect . . . . the defendant's version of 
the events . . . is likely to be a more accurate statement of what occurred that 
morning than an officer's testimony offered more than eight months after the events 
took place. And where, one may wonder was the officer in charge, Sergeant 
Bentley? While presumably available to corroborate this officer's gossamer, he 
was never called to testify . . . 
. . . . If we credit the defendant' statement, and I do, one cannot keep from 
finding Carroll's story incredible. 
Id. at 239-40. For support of his deep skepticism of police testimony and conduct, Judge Baer 
also cited to the federal prosecution of police officers in the same neighborhood of Washington 
Heights for perjury and false statements regarding arrests, and referred to the Mollen 
Commission report regarding police brutality and misconduct. See id. at 242. The public and 
political response to this deeply skeptical opinion regarding police credibility was unprecedented 
and Judge Baer subsequently reversed himself in United States v. Bayless (11). 921 F.Supp. 211 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996). See also Cloud, supra note 45, at 1347-50 & n.31 (discussing other 
recent federal cases where district court judges did not accredit police testimony). 
74. In part, this formulation of police "negligence" or technical breach is a result of the 
constitutional doctrine that search and seizure violations turn on "an objective assessment of the 
officer's actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time. Subjective 
intent alone . . . does not make otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional." Scott v. 
United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136 (1978). In other words, if the only proper legal inquiry is 
what a reasonable officer would have done, there is no need for the court to delve into issues 
of bad faith. Given that opportunity not to call the officer to task for his breach, the court will 
opt for more neutral, less accusatory language. Cloud provides excellent discussions of the 
objective test in search and seizure cases and its relationship to police perjury and misconduct. 
See Cloud, supra note 1; Cloud, supra note 72. 
75. See Cloud, supra note 1, at 1321. 
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police conduct under review includes, as a matter of course, the strong 
tendency to accredit police testimony. As already discussed, there are 
evidentiary and procedural reasons why a judge's review of any witness' 
testimony during a suppression hearing is a less serious enterprise. 
Professor Cloud has listed five additional reasons why the judge's 
review of police witness credibility is bound to be less scrutinizing during 
pre-trial suppression hearings.76 Specifically, " [jludges accept perjured 
testimony from police officers" regarding search and seizuren because (1) 
"it can be very difficult to determine whether a witness is lying," 
especially if the judge works under the principle that police officers are 
presumptively t rus t~or thy;~~ additionally, police officers are often 
"experienced witnesses" who can frame their narratives to "conform to 
constitutional  requirement^;"^^ (2) "judges dislike excluding probative 
ev iden~e;"~~ (3) judges are often predisposed to believe that the defendant 
is guilty;81 (4) assuming a swearing contest between the defendant and the 
police officer, judges are likely to disbelieve the defendantf2 and finally, 
(5) judges do not like to call police officers liars.83 Professor Cloud's list 
is not exhaustive. Another reason for judges' noncritical acceptance of 
police testimony is many judges' specific distaste for the exclusionary rule 
as it applies in a criminal procedure context. This is a refinement of 
Professor Cloud's reasons (2) and (3) as set forth above. A judge who 
may have no problem excluding proof under other evidentiary rules (for 
example, hearsay, cumulativeness, idammatory nature of the evidence, 
more prejudicial effect than probative value, among others) may have a big 
problem with the exclusionary rule under the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth 
Amendments specifically because exclusion by definition aids the defense, 
and more specifically rewards guilty  defendant^.^ 
The last two reasons why judges will casually accredit police 
testimony may be the most pernicious of all and the most corrosive of the 
rule of law. First, many judges accept without question the reality of 
urban policing as depicted by the police and their public advocates. Such 
an accepting attitude tends to relax judicial scrutiny on all issues of police 
honesty. The criminal procedure law permits police deceit in numerous 
contexts, and police training and standard practice encourages it. For 
76. See Cloud, supra note 1, at 1321-24. 
77. Id. at 1321. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 1321-22. 
80. Id. at 1322. 
81. See id. at 1323. 
82. See id. 
83. See id. at 1323-24. 
84. See, e.g., ROTHVIAX, supra note 16, at 35-65. 
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instance, standard police practice includes lying during the interrogation of 
witnesses,= performing searches and seizures for pretextual reasons,86 
and conducting various kinds of undercover  operation^,^^ all of which 
require deception and falsification. Much of this is popularly described 
and accepted as the "reality of the street." It is the way police conduct 
their business in our communities every day, and they make no apologies 
for it. 
Accordingly, judges may believe that police officers work in a grey 
zone of morality. Such judges are less likely to be sticklers on proper 
police conduct, and are thereby less likely to thoroughly scrutinize police 
testimony describing such conduct. Of course, such a belief and practice 
places these judges in a similarly grey moral (if not legal) universe.88 
The last and perhaps the most reprehensible reason for the knee-jerk 
accreditation of police testimony is rankly political. Particularly in high 
publicity cases and major offenses (but not exclusively so), judges don't 
want to be seen as "soft on crime." Whether elected or appointed, state 
court judges in particular are subject to significant pressures from the 
press, the public, and from the political powers that be. There is nothing 
worse for a judge, ever mindful of the political future, than having her 
picture and name on the front page of a city tabloid, with the headline 
decrying a pro-defendant ruling. Even life-tenured federal judg- 
es-presumably insulated from such political pressure-are not above such 
85. See Young, supra note 22; KAMISAR, supra note 22; Jerome H. Skolnick & Richard 
A. Leo. The Ethics of Deceptive Interrogation, 11 CRIMINAL JUSTICE ETHICS 3 (1992). 
86. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996); United States v. Villamonte- 
Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
87. See Skolnick, supra note 16. 
88. See Young, supra note 22, at 456 ("Courts treat police lying as a 'necessary evil,' yet 
they rarely articulate why they conclude it to be either necessary or evil.") (citations omitted). 
Professor Young then cites to cases that expressly seek to justify the deception. See id. at 456 
11.185. ("In one case permitting police lying that the murder weapon had been found, the court 
favorably cited the detective's testimony that 'the way to get police work done is to do it "the 
best way you can."') (quoting Moore v. Hopper, 389 F. Supp. 931,935 (M.D. Ga. 1974)); see 
also Commontvealth v. Cressinger, 44 A. 433, 433 (Pa. 1899) ("Society and the criminal are 
at war, and capture by surprise, or ambush, or masked battery, is as permissible in one case 
as in the other."). 
Cf. Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 197 (1993) (arguing that the current "reasonableness" inquiry into police practices by 
the court is in fact a "minimum rational basis" test that necessarily defers to police judgments 
of what is right and what is wrong). See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) 
(holding that a warrantless search of a sealed container found during a search of a car was 
valid). "When a legitimate search is under way . . . nice distinctions between . . . glove 
compartments, upholstered seats, trunks, and wrapped packages, in the case of a vehicle, must 
give way to the interest in the prompt and efficient completion of the task at hand." Id. at 821. 
(footnote omitted). 
89. See, e.g., United States v. Bayless (I), 913 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); United 
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It is significant, regarding the scope of the problem of honesty, that 
most of the above listed reasons why police testimony gets a free (or 
discounted) pass from judges apply whenever a judge is a factfinder, and 
not just during search-and-seizure hearings. A trial judge's unwillingness 
to discredit police testimony, the presumption of both the defendant's guilt 
and unreliability as a witness, the adoption of the police officer's grey zone 
moral perspective, and the political pressures to side with the prosecution, 
apply whenever a criminal court judge finds facts. Thus, the judiciary's 
unspoken presumption in favor of police witness credibility, much like the 
problem of police lying itself, is of a much greater dimension and effect 
than as found in the pre-trial litigation of probable cause or the reading of 
Mirandago rights. 
III. Other Scholarly Approaches to Police Lying 
A. Professor Skolnick: Institutional Rej6orm and the Elevation of the 
Prosecutorial Role and Duty 
Over the last many years, a number of scholars have suggested ways 
to inhibit police dishonest. particularly focussing on the incidence of 
police witness perjury. For instance, Professor Jerome Skolnick suggests 
that prosecutors take a more active role in preventing police deception and 
other misc~nduct.~~ He proposes that prosecutors can best explain to 
police officers the constitutional requirements placed on police conduct, 
and the necessity that police follow the rules in spite of their personal 
disagreement with the Supreme Court's restrictions on their official 
dis~retion.~' 
Professor Skolnick and his co-author James Fyfe also propose 
structural changes in police departments themselves, specifically advocating 
community-policing reforms that emphasize crime prevention rather than 
arrest quotas." With less emphasis on statistical "production," police 
officers would be less likely to make the marginal or bogus "collars" to 
meet the numerical allotment required by command. Presumably, with 
fewer improper or questionable arrests, there would be fewer occasions for 
States v. Bayless (In, 921 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
90. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
91. JEROME SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUTTRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC 
S o c ~ m  203 (2d ed. 1975). 
92. Id. 
93. See SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 33, at 237-66. 
Heinonline - -  26 Am. J. Crim. L. 474 1998-1999 
19991 Proving the Lie 475 
perjury (or other obstruction of justice) to sustain an otherwise illegal 
police act.94 
Again, the scope and emphasis of this article is judicial reform, not 
institutional and political change. However, Skolnick and Fyfe's institu- 
tional proposals, though laudable, only address a portion of the problem of 
police dishonesty-the false arrest and the constitutional tailoring of 
testimony. 
Whereas false arrest is a significant problem, dishonesty in the form 
of cover chargesgs and added falsifications to increase the likelihood of 
convictiong6 are probably as prevalent. In plainer terms, Professor 
Skolnick's proposal to de-emphasize arrest quotas would no doubt address 
the "drug sweep," where every person on a particular block at 2:00 A.M. 
is arrested for drug offenses, irrespective of evidence of guilt." Without 
an arrest quota, there would be little incentive for sweep arrests of this 
description. However, Professor Skolnick's proposals would not address 
the problem where, for example, a facilitator (that is, a "steerer") or a 
person arrested in mere possession of a small amount of narcotics is 
charged with the more serious crime of narcotics sale.98 These sorts of 
falsehoods aren't made to comply with quota require- 
ments-"overcharging" occurs because of more fundamental incentives and 
constraints inherent to policing and police culture.99 
For example, police officers will "overcharge" a case to aggrandize 
themselves, to anticipate the inevitable reduction of charges during plea- 
bargaining, or as an essentially adversarial act against a person the police 
officer presumes is guilty of the more serious crime, despite a lack of 
sufficient evidence. lW 
94. See id. at 189-90; see abo Fisher, supra note 19, at 14 (discussing the internal lies 
necessary to comply with arrest quotas and other forms of production). 
95. See CHEVIGNY, supra note 21. 
96. See Fisher, supra note 19, at 16-17; UVILLER, supra note 8, at 116-18. 
97. See CHEVIGNY, supra note 21, at 222-28 (describing what the author calls "dragnet 
arrestsn: "Officers . . . take people whom they believe to be users of narcotics out of 
buildings and off the streets . . . . [A] citizen is likely to be arrested any time he is found in 
circumstances even suggesting a connection with contrabandn). 
98. For instance, New York Penal Law 5 220.03, Criminal possession of a controlled 
substance in the seventh degree (i.e.. simple possession), is prosecuted as a misdemeanor, see 
N.Y. PENAL LAW 5 220.03 (McKinney 2000), as is Penal Law 5 115.00, Criminal facilitation 
in the fourth degree (i.e., simple facilitation), see N.Y. PENAL LAW 5 115.00 (McKinney, 
1998). On the other hand, Penal Law 5 220.39, Criminal sale of a controlled substance in the 
third degree (sale of any quantity of narcotics), is prosecuted as a B felony, see N.Y. PENAL 
LAW 5 220.39 (McKinney 2000). which carries a maximum sentence of twenty-five years, see 
N.Y. PENAL LAW 570.00 (McKimey 1998). 
99. See Fisher, supra note 19, at 16-17. 
100. Id. 
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Police officers will also invent cover charges when a suspect is 
injured during apprehension or while in custody. In order for the officer 
to defend against a potential claim of excessive force, he will attest that the 
injuries were a result of the defendant's assault on the officer or on the 
defendant's having resisted apprehension.IO' Again, the prevalence of 
cover charges would not be effected by the elimination of arrest quotas. 
Regarding the placing of responsibility on the prosecutor to explain to 
the police the requisites of lawful policing, such a proposal suggests a 
certain naivete both about prosecutors and about police attitudes towards 
prosecutors. Studies and anecdotal accounts have indicated prosecutorial 
nonchalance towards police perjury, particularly in regards to the tailoring 
of police testimony in pre-trial suppression hearings.lo2 Prosecutors often 
have the same antipathy to the legal requisites of search and seizure 
doctrine as do the police. Who is there to educate and monitor the 
prosecutors? More generally, a prosecutor may be at least as invested in 
the conviction of a defendant as the arresting police officer.'03 Prosecu- 
tors suffer under similar political constraints and pressures as judges. 
Though they may not have quotas, they are evaluated-either by supervi- 
sors or by the public-based on the number and the quality of their convic- 
tions. lo4 
Prosecutors also are constrained by their ongoing relationship with the 
police.105 They rely on police effort, cooperation, and good will for the 
quality of their cases.'06 Maintenance of such a close, dependent rela- 
tionship requires both tolerance and tact-tolerance of police misconduct 
(so long as it is not too outrageous and therefore impossible to ignore)'['' 
and timidity in confronting police officers with anything that might seem 
accusatory or blunt.'08 Prosecutors must always assure police officers 
that they are on the officers' side. The prosecutor who is too demanding 
of police officers, too judgmental, too "by the book" is often despised.'09 
101. See generally CHEVIGNY, supra note 21. 
102. See Orfield, supra note 2,  at 109-12; MOLLEN COhIhl'N REP., supra note 7, at 42; 
cf. UVILLER, supra note 8, at 115-18. 
103. See generally Stanley Z .  Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptunl 
Nenvork, 15 AM. J .  CRIM. LAW 197 (1988). 
104. See id. at 205-06. 
105. See id. at 209 11-59. 
106. See Chin & IVells, supra note 7,  at 263-64. 
107. See Rosenbaum, supra note 2, at 809; see also Orfield, Jr., supra, note 2 at 110; 
Slobogin, supra note 7,  at 1047. 
108. See Younger, supra note 8, at 596 ("The policeman is as likely to be indicted for 
perjury by his co-worker, the prosecutor, as he is to be struck down by thunderbolts from an 
avenging heaven"); see also Orfield, supra note 2, at 109-12. 
109. See generally McIntyre, Impediments to Effective Police Prosecutor Relationships, 13 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 201 (1975). 
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The consequence of being despised by the police is that the prosecutor gets 
very little cooperation. All of these aspects of the prosecutorial role and 
the relationship between prosecutors and police officers makes the 
prosecutor a questionable choice for the role of monitoring and deterring 
police officer dishonesty. 
B. The "Fourth Amendmentisfs: "Getting Rid of the Incentive to Lie 
Other scholars and pundits diagnose police dishonesty (and other 
pathologies) as largely a result of the constitutional rules of engagement as 
applied on the street."O The constitutional law of search and seizure and 
the exclusion of evidence in courtrooms-in other words, modern Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence-dictate the very nature of citizen-police 
encounters. These critics generally contend that search and seizure 
doctrine is unreasonable and impractical, while the remedy of evidentiary 
exclusion is both unreasonable and unjust."' Police officers resent this 
injustice and impracticability and react accordingly. 
On the street, they argue, police officers have to be able to respond 
to situations in the flow of events, rather than according to received 
d~ctrine."~ Professional intuitions and educated suspicions about 
criminality should be given credence, not discounted merely because some 
quantum of probable cause cannot be easily arti~ulated."~ For example, 
Professor Slobogin emphasizes that probable cause is a common sense 
concept, that it should reflect the experience level of the individual police 
officer making the judgment, and that the quantum of suspicion required 
for police action should vary depending on the level of intrusion involved. 
He names this proportionality principle, operating between suspicion and 
intrusion, the flexifying of probable cause."4 
Professor Slobogin recognizes that this proportionality calculus 
affords "extra discretion" to the police offi~er."~ However, such 
flexifying should diminish the officer's incentive to lie about probable 
cause because Professor Slobogin's regime would allow the testifying 
110. See, e.g., Craig M .  Bradley & Joseph L. Hoffmann, Public Perception, Justice and 
the "Search for Truth" in Criminal Cases, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1267, 1287-88 (1996); see 
generally CRAIG M. BRADLEY, THE FAILURE OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REVOLUTION 
(1993); ROTHWAX, supra note 16, at 35-65. 
111. See Bradley & Hoffman, supra note 110, at 1287-88; BRADLEY, supra note 110; 
ROTHWAX, supra note 16, at 35-65. 
112. See Slobogin, supra note 7, at 1056; Slobogin, supra note 37, at 68-75. 
113. See Slobogin, supra note 7, at 1056-57. 
114. See id. at 1055-57. 
115. Id. at 1057. 
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officer to describe the basis for his suspicions, hunches and provisional 
conclusions without worrying that his judgment did not perfectly coincide 
with rigid doctrine. The officer's judgment would be deemed reasonable 
so long as it was proportional to the level of intru~ion."~ 
Of course, Professor Slobogin's flexifying of probable cause has 
already taken place to a large extent, by the court's elastic analysis of what 
constitutes a seizure, what constitutes an arrest, and what police acts 
require probable cause in the first place. The court already holds the view 
that, in essence: "the mourth [Almendment does not prohibit intrusive 
actions that an individual officer reasonably believes necessary to enforce 
the law. Put another way, the Court will not second-guess police action 
that advances law enforcement interests so long as the conduct is not 
shocking. " 'I7 
The court's view of a common sense standard already sounds like 
Professor Slobogin's call for flexibility: the court weighs "the nature and 
quality of the intrusion on personal security against the importance of the 
governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion."l18 In that regard, 
a police chase,l19 a police seizure to pat down for weapons,lZ0 a car 
stop,121 a detention for purposes of inquiry,122 none of these seizures 
are deemed arrests, and therefore none of these require probable cause to 
justify the intrusion. Instead, each seizure is justified by important govern- 
mental interests. With such a free floating doctrine of deference to law 
enforcement interests, particularly regarding intrusions deemed short of an 
arrest, the flexifying of probable cause becomes doctrinal surplusage. 
Professor Amar comes to some similar conclusions about searches and 
seizures to Professor Slobogin, though premised more on an originalist 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment text itself and colonial hi~t0ry. l~~ 
116. Id. 
117. Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on 
the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1258 (1990). 
118. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 228 (1985). 
119. See, e.g., People v. De Bour, 352 N.E.2d 562 (1976) (stating that the police may 
forcibly pursue andlor stop an individual based on a reasonable suspicion that a crime has been 
committed). 
120. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (holding that police officer with reasonable fear 
for safety may "conduct a carefully limited search* for weapons). 
121. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) (stating that evidence from informant 
was sufficient to justify a limited search of the driver of the car for a weapon). 
122. See De Bour, 352 N.E.2d at 572 (saying a police officer is entitled to a "common law 
right of inquiry," whereby he may interfere with a citizen to the extent necessary to gain 
explanatory information). 
123. See AMAR, supra note 16, at 1-45. There is some substantial dispute with Professor 
Arnar concerning both textual and historical readings of the Fourth Amendment. See Morgan 
Cloud, Searching Through History; Searching For History, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1707, 1730-31 
(1996) (using Wiliam John Cuddihy's history of the Fourth Amendment to demonstrate errors 
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He is less concerned about police honesty. Professor Amar argues, as a 
textual matter, that the probable cause requirement in the Fourth Amend- 
ment refers only to the issuance of warrants (that no warrant shall issue 
without probable cause).Iz4 However, warrantless searches need only be 
reasonable-they do not require probable cause as a matter of original 
intent.12s Professor Amar contends that not only is this a proper reading 
of the constitutional text, but that it is a common sense understanding as 
well. Clearly, many searches and seizures are not and can not be subject 
to a probable cause requirement-for example, consent searches,126 plain 
views,'" metal detectors at  airport^,"^ building code and other admin- 
istrative inspecti~ns,'~~ Terry-stop pat downs,'30 prison searches,13' 
and grand jury s~bpoenas. '~~ 
In addition, probable cause (even when applicable) must not be a rigid 
concept. Justification for searches and seizures must calculate the 
imminence of harm, the intrusiveness of the search, the reason for the 
search, and so forth.133 AS a consequence, Professor Amar invokes a 
rule of reasonableness for all policelcitizen encounters that looks strikingly 
like Professor Slobogin's proportionality calculus, although with an 
in Amar's "originalistn interpretations); Donald Dripps, Akhil Amar On Criminal Procedure and 
Constitutional Law: "Here I Go Down That Wrong Road Again," 74 N.C. L. REV. 1559 
(1996) (arguing that Amar's errors include a neglect of 14th Amendment incorporation of the 
Bill of Rights, Due Process, and of the history of Supreme Court jurisprudence over the last 
80 years); Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 
856 (1994) (questioning Amar's original intent analysis as not properly accounting for post- 
colonial developments in modem policing and inter-racial conflict since the Civil War, both of 
which support warrant and probable cause preferences plus the exclusionary rule); cf. Maclin, 
supra note 91 (arguing that a "reasonablenessn test for the Fourth Amendment is a rubber-stamp 
"minimum rational basisn test). 
124. See AMAR, supra note 16, at 17-20. 
125. See id. at 31-40. 
126. See, e.g., United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974) (allowing third party 
consent for a search). 
127. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987) (stating that probable cause is not 
required when the seizure is minimally intrusive). 
128. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 675 (1989). 
129. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535 (1967). 
130. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
131. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (holding that the Fourth Amendment 
does not require probable cause to search a prison cell). 
132. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (saying that a summons to appeal 
at a grand jury trial does not violate any right protected by the Fourth Amendment and thus 
there is no requirement of reasonableness). Amar, in The Constitution and Criminal Procedure: 
First Principles, discusses additional searches and seizures which are not subject to a probable 
cause requirement. See AMAR, supra note 16, at 18. 
133. See generally AMAR, supra note 16, at 3140. 
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expanded list of relevant factors in the mix134 resulting in a "sliding 
scale0 of reasonableness. 
Additionally, both Professors Slobogin and Amar (and others) argue 
that inculpatory evidence should not be precluded from trial just because 
a police officer has overstepped legal bounds ("flexified" or not, reason- 
able or not). The just remedy for a constitutional infirmity cannot be an 
undeserved reward to a guilty defendant.'36 Additionally, Professor 
Amar argues that there is nothing in the original intent of the Fourth 
Amendment which contemplates evidentiary exclusion. He claims, instead, 
that original intent contemplates a claim for damages before a civil jury to 
remedy unreasonable police activity.137 
Most importantly for this discussion, many of these Fourth 
Amendmentist critics argue that unreasonable or inflexible rules of 
policelcitizen engagement combined with the threatened sanction of 
evidentiary exclusion forces police officers to choose between 1) compli- 
ance with inefficient and impracticable procedures that run counter to 
effective law enforcement, and 2) disregard of such procedures in order to 
be more effective, and then testilying about it subsequently, to avoid 
evidentiary exclusion.138 Professor Uviller describes this sort of tailored 
police testimony to avoid evidentiary exclusion most benignly as an 
"instrumental adjustment[,] . . . . [a] slight alteration in the facts to 
accommodate an unwieldy constitutional constraint and obtain a just 
result. " 139 
Because of his particular scholarly focus, Professor Amar is more 
concerned that the threat of evidentiary exclusion forces judges to distort 
doctrine in order to avoid exclusion. Judges (like police officers) generally 
dislike the exclusionary rule. The resulting distorted doctrine literally 
becomes a web of contemptible technicalities that alienates the citizenry 
from its own Constitution and interpretive institutions.14 No doubt, 
Professor Amar would argue that it alienates law enforcement (as part of 
the citizenry) as well from the very rules it is mandated to follow. 
134. Id. at 37-39 (noting that the racial impact of police practices should weigh in the 
balance of reasonableness). 
135. Steiker, supra note 123, at 856 n.196 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
136. See, e.g., Bradley & Hoffmann, supra note 110; see generally BRADLEY, supra note 
110; ROTHWAX, supra note 16, at 35-65. 
137. See AMAR, supra note 16, at 21-22; see also Ronald J .  Bacigal, Putting the People 
Back Into the Fourth Amendment, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359 (1994) (arguing for a return 
to jury trial determinations of Fourth Amendment violations). 
138. See Slobogin, supra note 7, at 1044; seegenerally Skolnick, supra note 16; UVILLER, 
supra note 8 .  
139. UVILLER, supra note 8, at 115-16. 
140. See AMAR, supra note 16, at 30. 
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Other critics of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence suggest similarly 
fundamental changes in search and seizure law-for example, instituting a 
good faith exception to both the warrant requirement and the probable 
cause requirement141-but most frequently, like Amar and Slobogin, 
eliminating the exclusionary rule a1t0gether.l~~ They generally suggest, 
as does Professor Amar, a civil or administrative rewards-and-punishment 
system to remedy constitutional breaches by law enf0r~ement.l~~ Profes- 
sor Slobogin advocates a liquidated damages remedy such as the one set 
forth by Professor David~w.'"~ Among other consequences of such re- 
forms, they argue that many if not all the incentives for police officers to 
lie would be e1imir1ated.l~~ 
In addition, there have been less radical arguments for a partial 
limitation on exclusion based on a "comparative reprehensibility" 
approach: that "a court should balance the seriousness of the officer's 
error against the gravity of the defendant's crime and only exclude 
evidence when, if ever, the reprehensibility of the officer's illegality is 
greater than the  defendant'^."'^^ This approach has never captured very 
141. This is based on the good faith exception as set forth in United States v. Leon, 468 
U.S. 897 (1984) (holding that an officer may act in reasonable reliance on a facially valid 
search warrant, even if such warrant is ultimately found to be invalid), Arizona v.  Evans, 514 
U.S. 1 (1995) (stating that a computer error showing outstanding warrant could be reasonable 
relied upon), Justice White's dissent in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1060 (1984) 
 white,^., dissenting) (arguing for a good faith exception in civil deportation proceedings), and 
in his dissent in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 538 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) (supporting 
the idea that the exclusionary rule should not apply when officers with a good faith belief that 
they were acting lawfully have a reasonable basis for that belief). Good faith exceptions to the 
warrant requirement and probable cause have been held elsewhere in the lower federal courts. 
See references in Thomas K. Clancy, Extending the Good Faith Exception to the Fourth 
Amendment's Exclusionary Rule to Warrantless Seizures That Serve as a Basis for the Search 
Warrant. 32 HOW. L. REV. 697 (1995); see also William A. Schroeder, Deterring Fourth 
Amendment Violations: Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 GEO. L. J. 1361 (1981) 
(supporting police mlemaking to replace evidentiary exclusion with a good faith exception). 
142. See, e.g., BRADFORD P. WILSON, ENFORCING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A 
JURISPRUDENnALHlSTORY 122 (1986); Caleb Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of 
Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REV. 493, 495 9 (1955); Richard A. Posner, Excessive 
Sanctions for Governmental Misconduct in Criminal Cases, 57 WASH. L. REV. 635,638 (1982) 
(suggesting fining a police officer whose conduct was inappropriate rather than applying the 
exclusionary rule); cf. ROTHWAX, supra note 16, at 35-65 (suggesting courts make exclusion 
discretionary). 
143. See AMAR, supra note 16, at 21-22; see also Bacigal, supra note 137, at 359. 
144. See Slobogin, supra note 7, at 158; Robert P. Davidow, Criminal Procedure 
Ombudsman As A Substitute for the Exclusionary Rule: A Proposal, 4 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 317 
(1973); Robert P. Davidow, Criminal Procedure Ombudsman Revisited, 73 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIhflNOLOGY 939 (1982). 
145. See Slobogin, supra note 7, at 158; Davidow, supra note 144, at 317; Davidow, 
supra note 144, at 939. 
146. Yale Kamisar, "Comparative Reprehensibility" and the Fourth Amendment 
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much judicial and scholarly support. It has been most effectively rebutted 
by Professor Kamisar's argument that an exception to exclusion for 
evidence of murder, kidnapping, or rape would in essence amend the 
Fourth Amendment, creating no deterrent for unconstitutional police 
conduct in investigations of serious crimes.I4' More significantly, in 
regards to police lying, a doctrine of comparative reprehensibility might 
create a significant incentive for police officers to overcharge cases in 
order to free them up from constitutional strictures. Thus an unarmed 
robbery would be falsely characterized by the arresting officer as a 
suspected armed robbery, so as to interject the serious crimes exception to 
the exclusionary rule, thereby removing the deterrent effect of exclusion. 
The fourth Amendmentists almost uniformly support their claim for 
the elimination of the exclusionary rule with the historical observation that 
police testilying only became a problem after Mapp v. Ohio,I4' and after 
that case was applied to the states allowing evidentiary exclusion to 
searches absent probable cause.14' They argue that before that epochal 
decision, police officers in state prosecutions had no real reason to 
prevaricate on the stand since an improper search, even if proven, would 
not hamstring the prosecution while rewarding a guilty defendant.I5O 
Unfortunately, the fact that police testilying only became a problem 
after Mapp begs the question of whether police witnesses lied under oath 
before Mapp, but that such false testimony wasn't considered a problem 
(legal or otherwise) at that time. Certainly, many categories of police 
dishonesty pre-dated Mapp-cover charges,''' lies to hide cor rupt i~n , '~~  
lies to hide brutality,153 false or trumped up charges to meet quotas,lS4 
deceptions as part of run-of-the-mill police investigation  procedure^,'^^ 
among others. Almost none of the corruption and attendant lies and cover- 
ups revealed by the Knapp Commission report, the Prince of the City 
Exclusionary Rule, 86 MICH L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1987). Kamisar describes a theory set forth by 
John Kaplan. See id. (referring to John Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. 
L. REV. 1027, 1046 (1974)) (drawing on comments made by Judge Robert Bork in United 
States v. Mount, 757 F.2d 1315, 1323 @.C. Cir. 1985)). 
147. See Kamisar, supra note 146, at 46. 
148. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
149. See id. 
150. See sources cited supra notes 13 & 15. 
151. See CHEVIGNY, supra note 21, at 136-46. 
152. See generally, KNAPP COMM'N REP., supra note 11; LARDNER, supra note 19; 
KORNBLUM, supra note 20, at 15-46. 
153. See CHRISTOPHERCOMM'N REP., supra note 11, at 68-70; MOLLEN COMM'N REP., 
supra note 7. 
154. See Skolnick & Fyfe, supra note 33, at 189-90. 
155. See generally Young. supra note 22; Skolnick. supra note 16; KAMISAR, supra note 
22. 
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prosecutions, and before that, the Wickersham and Lexow reports,156 had 
anything to do with testilying to meet constitutional requisites. Such 
revelations had everything to do with police culture and the norms that 
prevailed in that culture at those historical times, and still prevail to this 
day. 
In addition, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence over the last thirty years 
or so has indeed flexified: it has sought to accommodate the varying 
degrees of police expertise, the need for discretion in law enforcement, the 
importance of officer safety, the inevitability of administrative law 
enforcement needs, the significance of good faith errors, and the different 
degrees of intrusion bearing some reasonable relation to the level of 
suspicion required to justify such intrusion. In other words, at least since 
Terry v. the courts have factored into the Fourth Amendment 
calculus more and more of the realities and concerns of law enforcement, 
to make the law of policelcitizen encounters more reasonable (at least as 
far as the police are concerned). Yet there is no evidence that such judicial 
accommodation to the needs of law enforcement has reduced the amount 
of testilying or addressed the threat that police lying poses for the criminal 
justice system. 
Lastly, eliminating evidentiary exclusion as a sanction for constitution- 
al breaches is only supportable if another remedy is substituted in its place 
to effectively deter police misconduct. Here, Professor Carol Steiker's 
critique of civil or administrative approaches to police violations of 
constitutional safeguards is well taken: 
Even if legislatures enacted the kind of comprehensive remedial scheme 
proposed by Professor Amar, the ultimate distribution of such remedies 
would lie largely in the hands of juries. Can we be confident that juries 
would award Fourth Amendment remedies sufficient to create litigation 
156. See generally N.Y.C. COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, BREAKING THE US VS. THEM 
BARRIER: A REP. ON POLICE COMMUNITYRELATIONS (1993); MOLLEN COMM'N REP., supra 
note 7; CHRISTOPHER COMM'N REP., supra note 11; KNAPP COMM'N REP., supra note 11; 
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REP.: 
THE POLICE (1967); HEARING HELD AT THE U.S. CT. HOUSE, FOLEY SQUARE, N.Y., MARCH 
14, 1951 BEFORE THE SENATE SPECIAL COMM. TO INVESTIGATEORGANIZED CRIME IN INTER- 
STATE COMMERCE (1951); REP. OF SPECIAL~NVESTIGA~ONBY THE DIST. ATT'Y OF KINGS CO. 
AND THE DEC. 1949 GRAND JURY; FINAL REP. OF SAMUEL SEABURY, REFEREE IN THE 
MATIER OF THE INVESTIGATIONOF THE MAGISTRATE'S COURTS IN THE FIRST JUDICIALDEP'T 
AND THE MAGISTRATES THEREOF, AND OF ATTORNEYS AT LAW PRACTICING IN SAID COURTS 
(1932); NAT'L COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT(1931); CHARENCELEXOW, 
REP. OF THE SPECIAL COMM. OF THE BD. OF ALDERMEN OF THE CITY' OF N.Y. TO 
INVESTIGATE THE POLICE DEP'T (1913); REP., SPECIAL COMM. APPOINTED TO INVESTIGATE 
THE POLICE DEP'T OF THE CITY OF N.Y. (1895); but see CRIM. JUSTICEIN CRISIS, supra note 
11; Baer, supra note 11, at 5-6; Condon, supra note 11, at 55. 
157. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
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incentives and thus to promote adequate deterrence?lS8 
After all, people charged with crimes are no more sympathetic to juries as 
civil plaintiffs than they are as criminal  defendant^.'^^ Administrative 
regulation of police practices promises no greater return. ''PJven when 
they face governmental liability for damages, administrators feel counter- 
vailing pressures to tolerate low-level misconduct . . . . [o]rganizational 
incentives may on balance outweigh the fiscal ones that governmental 
liability creates. 
Lastly, an officer charged in a civil or administrative action with 
unconstitutional conduct, and facing suspension, dismissal, fines or 
damages, would have every incentive to lie in such a proceeding.16' In 
order to create a strong disincentive to police breaches of the Fourth 
Amendment, a civil or administrative process would have to promise strong 
medicine against the offender and the department-damages, fines, loss of 
privileges and even termination of the officer. Certainly, such sanctions 
would create at least as strong an incentive to testily as does evidentiary 
exclusion (perhaps more so, given the personal consequences for the police 
officer and the internal pressures from the departmental hierarchy).162 
And would prosecutors or judges be more vigilant about police 
testimony if evidentiary exclusion was no longer the remedy for unconstitu- 
tional conduct? Probably not, since many of the reasons why judges and 
prosecutors wink and nod at police lying would still apply-the presump- 
tion of credibility, the timidity in finding an officer a liar, the dependent 
relationship between prosecutor and law enforcement, the presumption of 
distrust which attaches to the criminal defendant, the relaxation of judicial 
scrutiny because police officers work in a grey moral universe, and the 
inevitable politicization of the process. 
In sum, a doctrinal or procedural reconfiguring of search and seizure 
law, as advocated by the Fourth Arnendmentists, would not have a 
comprehensive effect on the incidence of police lying. The flexifying of 
the Fourth Amendment in'the courts has already occurred to a great extent 
over the last thirty years, with no demonstrable proof of a reduction in 
testilying. In addition, much police lying does not involve search and 
158. Steiker, supra note 123, at 849. 
159. See Dripps, supra note 123, at 1617 n.267 (citing Foote, supra note 142, at 504-507) 
(noting that a plaintiffs criminal record would be admissible at a civil trial for Fourth 
Amendment violations both to impeach and to mitigate damages). 
160. PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL 
WRONGS 125 (1983) (cited in Steiker, supra note 123, at 849 n.164). 
161. See Orfield. supra note 2, at 126. 
162. Cf. CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS, supra note 11, at 20 ("[Police officers] are not 
eager to replace [the exclusionary rule] with different sanctions such as expanded civil remedies 
against the police officer or the department."). 
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seizure practices. Lastly, such emphasis on the Fourth Amendment does 
not properly consider the entirety of police culture, it norms and its 
discontents. The elimination of the exclusionary rule would provide no 
necessary reduction of police testilying either, so long as the substitute civil 
or administrative process would punish individual police misconduct and 
police departments. Police officers facing suspension or fines or depart- 
mental discipline would have every incentive to lie in order to avoid 
sanctions, just as they do now in avoiding exclusion. 
C. Evidentiary Approaches to Deterring Police Lying 
Professor Donald Dripps has proposed an intriguing but ultimately 
flawed evidentiary response to police lying.lb3 He suggests that the court 
should authorize the administration of polygraph examinations of the 
defendant and the police witness, and admit the results into evidence at a 
pre-trial suppression hearing, particularly when there is a "swearing 
contestjl" between defense and prosecution witne~ses. '~~ Professor 
Dripps argues that polygraph evidence is reliable scientific proof that can 
pass muster under the prevailing rules of evidence, and help the judge, as 
finder of fact, to determine witness credibility.I6' It would serve as a tie- 
breaker, particularly when there is no other corroborating evidence.Ib6 
The problems with Professor Dripps' modest proposal are many, while 
its virtues are few. A threshold difficulty is the technology itself, which 
has yet to be widely adopted in criminal cases, and recently experienced 
a severe setback in the Supreme Court case United States v. S~hefe r '~~  
(which came down after the publication of Professor Dripps' article). 
A second problem is the limited extent to which the technology would 
be used under Dripps' proposed regime. Only uncorroborated police 
testimony contradicted by defense testimony in a hearing on unconstitution- 
al police conduct would merit the introduction of the polygraph evidence. 
Practically speaking, defendants rarely testify in pre-trial suppression 
hearings, subjecting themselves to prosecutorial cross-examination on 
matters directly bearing on g ~ i 1 t . I ~ ~  It would be even more unlikely 
163. See Dripps, supra note 15. 
164. Id. at 693-94. 
165. See id. at 702-16. 
166. See id. 
167. 523 U.S. 303 (1998) (holding that the Military Rule of Evidence precluding polygraph 
evidence is not a violation of defendant's Due Process rights). 
168. C' Barbara Allen Babcock, Introduction: Taking the Stand, 35 WM. AND MARY L. 
REV. 1 (1993) (describing the difficulties inherent in a defendant's choice to testify, particularly 
given the court's inclination to enhance the defendant's sentence if the defendant takes the stand 
and the jury rejects his story). 
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(under Professor Dripps' proposal) for a cautious defense attorney to advise 
a client to testify at a pre-trial hearing followed by a polygraph examination 
where questions bearing directly on guilt and credibility would be asked 
and evaluated by a lie detector. 
An additional limiting condition, is that the officer's testimony must 
be uncorroborated. This produces a troubling question for Professor 
Dripps-would the testimony of the arresting officer's partner suffice as 
corroboration, precluding use of the polygraph?169 In that connection, 
Professor Dripps argues that the threat of a polygraph examination would 
create incentives for the police to corroborate by putting interrogations on 
videotape, for instance. On the contrary, polygraph evidence might create 
incentives for the police to manufacture corroboration so as to avoid the 
examination in the first place. 
Lastly, Professor Dripps' argument only deals with a very small subset 
of police witness falsification, uncorroborated testimony in a pre-trial 
suppression hearing where the defendant testifies in direct contradiction. 
As discussed previously, police lying is a much more widespread and 
complex phenomena than Professor Dripps' analysis would otherwise 
indicate. 
Professor Gabriel Chin and Scott Wells provide a much more 
promising evidentiary suggestion to confront police witness credibility.170 
They propose that courts permit impeachment of police testimony through 
proof of bias and motive to lie, and by using extrinsic evi- 
dence-specifically, the prevalence of the so-called blue wall of si- 
lence.I7' This "unwritten code" of police silence "prohibits disclosing 
perjury or other misconduct by a fellow officer, or even testifying 
truthfully if the facts would implicate the conduct of a fellow officer."'74 
Professor Chin and Mr. Wells would permit examination of witnesses on 
the subject of the code of silence, extrinsic evidence testimony on the 
existence of the phenomenon, and a judicial instruction to the jury alerting 
them to the suspect nature of the challenged testim~ny."~ 
No doubt, judges should permit such cross-e.Yamination and perfection 
of the impeachment with extrinsic proof of the existence of the blue wall 
of silence. However, as a practical and procedural matter, criminal trial 
169. This question is critical, given the nature of the blue wall of solidarity that exists ' 
between brother officers, and the likelihood that more than one officer would be involved in 
any citizenlpolice encounter. For a helpful example of how corroboration of one officer's 
testimony by another officer's word tends to effect the trial court's determination of credibility, 
see Bayless (II). United States v. Bayless (II), 921 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
170. See Chin & Wells, supra note 7, at 237. 
171. See id. 
174. Id. 
175. See id. at 272-99. 
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courts will not permit such examination and impeachment (much less a jury 
instruction) without a proffer that first convinces the court that the police 
witness may, in fact, be lying. In other words, only upon a showing of 
prior inc~nsistency,'~~ contradiction,ln actual bias or self-interest,17* 
or a pattern of deception attaching to the prior conduct of the individual 
officerjwitness proving the motive,179 will the court permit such a theory 
of motive as sufficiently probative of the witness' bias. 
Additionally, blue wall of silence impeachment and a related 
cautionary jury instruction would only apply in circumstances where the 
motive of the lie was demonstrably to protect a fellow officer.lsO 
Admittedly, it is not a fair criticism of the Chin and Wells proposal that it 
has insufficient scope, since they make no claim that blue wall impeach- 
ment would remedy all incidences of police witness falsifi~ation.'~' 
However, it is worth noting how much police lying does not involve the 
code of silence per se, but rather the seemingly inevitable pressures, 
incentives, discontents, and professional expectations characteristic of 
policing. 
Professor Chin and Mr. Wells use two cases, United States v. 
Abe11s2 and Osborne v. City of Long BeachlS3 to show that membership 
of a witness in a group that shares a code of loyalty or silence is itself 
probative of bias.lS4 However, both cases stand for something much less 
than the admissibility of blue wall of silence impeachment testimony in a 
case where the witness is not a party or an interested witness as a matter 
176. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(l); CHARLEST. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 
(3d ed. 1984) $34. 
177. See MCCORMICK, supra note 176, at 8 47. 
178. See H. Richard Uviller, Credence, Character, and the Rules of Evidence: Seeing 
Through the Liar's Tale, 42 DUKE L. J. 776,784-86 (1993) (discussing impeachment by bias). 
179. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
180. See Chin &Wells, supra note 7, at 237 (stating the "unwritten code" of police silence 
"prohibits disclosing perjury or other misconduct by a fellow officer, or even testifying 
tmthfully if the facts would implicate the conduct of a fellow officern). 
181. See Chin & IVells, supra note 7, at 244 ("This proposal is consciously incremental 
and practical."). 
182. 469 U.S. 45 (1984). 
183. 865 F.2d 264, 1988 JVL 141391 (9th Cir. 1988) (unpublished opinion). 
184. See Chin & IVells, supra note 7, at 275-79. 
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of fact called by a party,'85 but merely the arresting officer in a garden 
variety criminal case. 
In Abel, a defense witness was a member of the same secret prison 
gang as the defendant, and both the defendant and the witness were 
required by the gang's code of loyalty to deny the gang's existence, 
commit perjury, and even to commit murder to protect other members.1B6 
However, the government only introduced the code of loyalty in order to 
impeach the defense witness, a friend from the defendant's prison days, 
after he had testified that a primary government witness had admitted to 
framing the defendant in exchange for favorable government treatment.lS7 
In other words, a foundation had been laid for proof of bias by testimony 
of a defense witness who had a clear personal as well as associational 
relationship with the defendant. This proved that the defense witness was 
interested as a matter of fact in the acquittal of the defendant.Is8 In 
addition, a swearing contest of sorts had occurred, placing the credibility 
of both the prosecution and defense witnesses at the very center of the 
case.Isg Lastly, the code of loyalty and silence of the "Aryan Brother- 
hood" gang was an essential and explicit associational feature of the gang 
itself (unlike the implicit blue wall of silence in police culture).1g0 
In Osborne, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and 
remanded a civil judgment in favor of several defendant Long Beach police 
officers, holding that the trial court erred in automatically precluding 
plaintiffs evidence of the blue wall of silence.Ig1 The circuit court 
applied the Abel line of reasoning that "a witness and a party's common 
membership in an organization even without proof that the witness or party 
has personally adopted its tenets is certainly probative of bias."'" ]In 
Osborne, the plaintiff had sought blue wall testimony in a $1983 case 
involving excessive force to impeach a police witnessldefendant whose 
sworn statement was inconsistent with arrest reports.'" 
185. See People v. Bowden, 198 A.D.2d 39 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (defining a defendant 
who testifies as an interested witness as a matter of law; other witnesses may be interested as 
well, as a matter of fact); see generally discussion on "the Disposition to Lie Under Oath" in 
Uviller, supra note 178, at 813-15 ("In my view (to state it bluntly), nearly all people choose 
to lie on the witness stand according to two determinants: the importance to them of having a 
falsehood believed and their confidence that their false testimony will achieve that end with 
minimal risk.") (emphasis added). 
186. See Abel, 469 U.S. at 47. 
187. See id. 
188. See id. at 467. 
189. See id. at 466-67. 
190. See id. at 466. 
191. See Osborne, 865 F.2d 264, 1988 WL 141391 at *9 (unpublished opinion). 
192. Id. at *4 (quoting Abel, 469 U.S. at 52). 
193. See id. at *2-3. 
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In both Abel and Osborne, a clear foundation for extrinsic evidence to 
prove partiality has been laid. In both cases, proof of bias and motive 
dovetail with actual conflicts in the testimony: in Abel, a swearing contest 
between two witnes~es, '~~ while in Osborne, conflicting accounts between 
a witness and his prior written reports.1gs In the first case, the govern- 
ment clearly could demonstrate that the defense witness was an interested 
witness as a matter of fact;lg6 in the second case, the witness was an 
interested witness as a matter of law.lg7 Again, the extrinsic proof of 
bias and motive to lie neatly tied in with matters of testimony that (to some 
extent) "proved the lie." 
However, without some proof of the lie itself, a motive to lie is not 
probative; at best, it is much more prejudicial than probative.lg8 Particu- 
larly when the motive to lie comes from a generalized characterization of 
police culture, courts are going to want to see more than the defendant's 
offer of proof that such a code of silence exists, or even that it is prevalent, 
and that therefore this police witness is not credible.lg9 In that sense, 
perfecting the impeachment by proof of motive to lie is the last step in the 
full-dress litigation of the credibility of a police witness. A foundation 
must first be laid, and that foundation can only be built on proof of prior 
inconsistency, contradiction, or some other challenge to the reliability of 
the police witness. 
Chin and Wells touch on this reality when they cite to Judge Irving 
Younger's opinion in People v. M c M ~ r t y , ~  but they do not realize its 
full import in that case. In McMurty, the court determined that " '[d]ropsy7 
testimony should be scrutinized with especial ca~tion."'~' Dropsy 
testimony was inherently suspect because it was so likely to be false, so 
likely to be constitutionally t a i l ~ r e d . ~  Yet in McMurty , Judge Younger 
ultimately held that the prosecution had met its burden of proof to admit 
the evidence because the officer's testimony did not appear to be untruth- 
194. See Abel, 469 U.S. at 466-67. 
195. See Osborne, 865 F.2d 264, 1988 WL 141391, at *2-3. 
196. See Abel, 469 U.S. at 466-67. 
197. See Osborne, 865 F.2d 264, 1988 WL 141391, at *3. 
198. Interestingly enough, the Ninth Circuit in Osborne remanded the case back to the trial 
court to determine whether the blue wall testimony was sufficiently probative to outweigh its 
prejudicial effect under FRE Rule 403. See Osborne, 865 F.2d 264, 1988 WL 141391, at *3. 
199. Chin & Wells recognize this in their discussion of Bush v. United States, 375 F.2d 
602 @.C. Cir. 1967), where then Circuit Judge Warren Burger declined to offer a cautionary 
instruction regarding police witness testimony. See Chin & Wells, supra note 7, at 265. 
200. See Chin & 'Wells, supra note 7, at 267-68 (citing People v. McMurty, 314 N.Y.S.2d 
194 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1970)). 
201. McMurfy, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 197. 
202. See Chin & Wells, supra note 7, at 267-68. 
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ful, and there was no contradiction from other t e s t i m ~ n y . ~  In other 
words, a trier-of-fact who was fully cognizant of the motive to lie and the 
prevalence of false dropsy testimony in the criminal courts of New York 
Citym did not assign much if any weight to that motive without some 
proof in the individual case before him of an actual lie. 
Similarly, in Maynard v. SaylesZo5 (another case discussed by Chin 
and Wellsm6), an Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals panel held that the trial 
court should have permitted evidence of the blue wall of silence, but only 
after an adequate foundation of proof of police misconduct had already 
been es tab l i~hed .~  Maynard was a civil case pled against I h s a s  City 
police officers who had been charged with excessive use of force.208 
Clearly, since the gravamen of the civil complaint itself was police 
misconduct and police witnesses were necessarily interested w i t n e s s e ~ , ~ ~  
an adequate proffer of unreliability could be made as a prelude to 
impeachment using extrinsic evidence of motive. 
In a criminal case, where the police officers are not parties (that is, 
they are not the accused), and where their misconduct is not the gravamen 
of the charge, the evidentiary bar will be set much higher. To expect trial 
courts to lower the bar to the admission of extrinsic evidence to prove 
motive is frankly unrealistic. A more attainable reform ~vould be an 
expansion of discovery and cross-examination to show inconsistency, 
contradiction, and particularized proof of bias, prejudice, or self-interest. 
Once the court is shown proof of the lie, then the request for admission of 
extrinsic evidence to show motive will be a lot less attenuated. 
In sum, the use Chin and Wells make of Abel,2I0 Osborne,2" 
McMurtry,212 and MaynardY2l3 though very helpful, begs the question 
as to how one can litigate police credibility to expose the lie, given the 
resistance of criminal trial judges in permitting adequate discovery and full- 
dress cross examination of police witnesses. Without an attorney's ability 
203. See McMurly, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 198. 
204. See Younger, supra note 8, at 596-97 (discussing the prevalence of police perjury to 
meet constitutional requisites in an article in the Nation three years before McMurty). 
205. 817 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1987), vacated en banc, 831 F.2d 173 (8th Cir. 1987). 
206. See Chin & Wells, supra note 7, at 270-72. 
207. See id. at 53. 
208. See id. at 51-52. 
209. See People v. Bowden, 198 A.D.2d 39 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993); see generally 
Uviller, supra note 178, at 813-15. 
210. United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984). 
211. Osborne v. City of Long Beach, 865 F.2d 264, 1988 WL 141391 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(unpublished opinion). 
212. People v. McMurty. 314 N.Y.S.2d 194 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1970). 
213. Maynard, 817 F.2d at 50. 
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to show proof of the lie, extrinsic proof of the motive to lie will not be 
entertained. 
IV. Judges Applying Enhanced Scrutiny and Permitting Expanded 
Discovery and Full Dress Cross Examination of Police Witnesses 
A. Impeachment by Omission 
Scholarship and studies have come to somewhat consistent conclu- 
sions: police officers will lie on police reports (for instance in overstating 
the evidence of an accused's guilt). More often than they lie affirmatively, 
police officers will omit facts from their reports.'14 There are any 
number of reasons why police officers both misrepresent and tactically omit 
facts on their reports, only some of which directly relate to the tailoring of 
testimony to meet constitutional requirements.'15 However, judges rarely 
see police reports in criminal cases until those cases reach the pre-trial 
hearing stage, or the trial itself. Therefore, the most direct effect that 
criminal court judges can have on the truthfulness of police reports lies in 
the manner in which those judges treat such reports at latter stages of 
litigation. A more scrutinizing approach to police reports by judges at 
hearings and trial could serve to deter the practices both of falsification and 
the strategic omission of Edcts from reports in the field. 
The responsibility here necessarily falls on the shoulders of the 
criminal court judge. Civil court judges are limited in their ability to effect 
the format, use and preservation of police documents (and the training and 
supervision of officers regarding those documents) first, by the absence of 
Brady obligations on the police216 and second, by the legal doctrine of 
separation of powers.217 The civil courts have been loath to interfere 
214. See Fisher, supra note 19, at 17-18, 26-31. 
215. See Fisher. supra note 19, at 15-17. 
216. See Brady v. Maryland. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The Brady doctrine has never been 
extended from the prosecutorial duty to disclose to a correlative duty for the police to preserve 
and disclose exculpatory evidence. In that connection, see California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 
479 (1984) (involving the police's duty to preserve breath sample in a DWI prosecution) and 
Arizona v. Youngblood. 488 U.S. 51 (1988) (regarding police's duty to preserve sexual assault 
evidence kit containing blood and other samples). In both Trombetta and Youngblood, the court 
held that only a bad faith destruction of evidence by the police would have resulted in a Due 
Process violation. See Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488; Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58. The mere 
negligent loss of evidence in both cases were not deemed sufficient to reverse convictions on 
constitutional grounds. See Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488; Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58. 
217. See e.g., Palmer v. City of Chicago, 755 F.2d 560, 573-78 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding 
that injunction against Chicago Police Department double-file investigation and reporting system 
was a too broad judicial intervention in what is a discretionary function). Fisher provides an 
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with the internal processes of police administration by enjoining the 
executive branch to change the manner in which police work is conducted, 
memorialized, and preserved. However, a cool reception to inadequate 
report writing in our criminal trial courts could have a powerful deterrent 
effect without requiring judicial meddling in executive and administrative 
matters.218 
A main function of a police report is to recite those basic facts 
obtained or observed which constitute probable cause to support an 
arrest.219 To that extent, such reports-if inaccurate or misleading-will 
feed directly into perjurious testimony at a probable cause hearing and later 
at trial. Police reports are necessarily connected to the officer's testimony 
at a pre-trial suppression hearing or at trial. Such reports are discoverable 
to the defense, so that a failure by the officer to testify consistently with 
the facts recited in his reports provides a golden opportunity for defense 
impeachment based on prior inconsistent  statement^.^ 
Police reports will impact hearing and trial testimony as well, because 
such reports are often necessary to refresh the officer's recollection when 
testifying to the facts of the arrest (or the interrogation or the identification 
procedure).221 Hearings and trials may take place many months after the 
events they concern. Officers may not remember the specific facts of a 
case or of an arrest, and they may require their reports to aid their 
memory.222 
To that extent, police officers who lie on the stand to tailor the facts 
of the arrest to constitutional requisites, or who alter the facts to reflect 
false cover charges, or to reflect higher counts than the facts would 
otherwise justify, will generally have police reports that will allow them to 
do that.223 The reports will occasionally contain a false and detailed 
recitation of facts that neatly meets constitutional standards, a rendition 
which police witnesses will recite faithfully during testimony-tailored 
reports producing tailored testimony. More likely, however, the reports 
will have a minimal recitation of the facts, so skeletal that the report 
excellent discussion on the limits of civil intervention in internal police practices. See Fisher, 
supra note 19, at 42-51. 
218. See Fisher. supra note 19, at 51. 
219. See Fisher, supra note 19, at 8. 
220. See id. at 29-31; see also FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(l); MCCORMICK, srlpra note 176, 
at 0 34. 
221. See Fisher, supra note 19, at 32; see also FED. R.  EVID. 612; MCCORMICK, supra 
note 176, at 8 9. 
222. See Fisher, supra note 19, at 32. 
223. See id. at 30 (describing a "strategic approach to report-writing as a means to prevent 
embarrassment, civil liability, or loss of the prosecution's casen). 
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permits the police officer to testify untruthfully, but not inconsistently with 
the report's bare-bones account of the case.224 
The only potential problem the officer will have when testifying based 
on such a sketchy police report is convincing the factfinder that he has 
independent recollection of the events testified to. However, a reasonably 
well-prepared and experienced police witness will have no problem 
convincing the trial judge of the adequacy of his memory and the veracity 
of his story." First, as already stated, judges will tend to accredit 
police testimony as a matter of course. Second, defense attorneys attempt 
to impeach the police witness on grounds that the prior statement-the 
police report-is inconsistent with the officer's present testimony because 
the report does not contain many of the facts that, months later, the officer 
is recalling and swearing to on the stand.226 However, this "impeach- 
ment by omission" tack rarely persuades the judge-as-factfinder, precisely 
because such impeachment requires for its foundation that the material fact 
now testified to must be of such quality that it would have been naturally 
mentioned in the prior statement.227 In other words, only if the new fact 
should have been present in the police report does its omission have any 
impeachment value. Thus, a departrnent-wide practice and policy to record 
minimal factual accounts in police reports can convince the judge that such 
factual detail, however material, would not naturally be mentioned in a 
police report, and therefore has little impeachment value against this 
particular police witness.228 As a consequence, a police department 
practice and policy of minimalist reporting to afford testifying officers the 
freedom to prevaricate on the stand also protects them from impeachment 
based on inconsistency. 
224. See id. at 17. 
225. See Cloud, supra note 1, at 1322. Cloud states: 
Many officers become experienced witnesses. By virtue of their work they are 
likely to have testified many times, and to have refined and improved their 
techniques with practice. They are as comfortable in court as any witness who is 
likely to be subjected to vigorous cross-examination can be. As a result, their 
courtroom demeanor is likely to be good, and they are likely to tell stories bearing 
at least some indicia of substantive plausibility. 
Id. 
226. See MCCORMICK. supra note 176, at 5 34 (discussing "impeachment by omission" 
and its proper foundation). 
227. See id. 
228. See Fisher, supra note 19, at 26-31 (describing forms and training materials from 
various police agencies). Professor Fisher concludes that police as a matter of policy and 
practice are trained to ignore exculpatory facts in their reports, to emphasize self-protection 
against civil liability, to use paraphrases and approximations in their documents in place of 
verbatim witness descriptions to deny defense opportunities to conduct cross-examination, and 
other means of minimalist reportilying. See id. 
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Judges have great power in this connection, if they wish to use it. If 
police honesty in the courtroom is as serious a matter as commentators 
contend (and this author agrees), then judges must use that power. Since 
impeachment by omission requires as a foundation the establishment that 
a particular material fact should have naturally been present in the report, 
the court can and should reject a departmental policy or practice which 
redacts or omits material facts as being "not naturaln-meaning not the 
expected (or proper) way a public official should write a report-regardless 
of local policy and practice. As part of its factfinding role, the court can 
choose not to accept the officer's explanation that the absence of certain 
facts in a report is of no moment, that the officer was merely observing 
departmental policy to not record important facts in police reports, and 
factor that inconsistency into the determination of the witness' reliability. 
If judges were more receptive to impeachment by omission in police 
documents, this would provide significant incentive to officers and the 
police hierarchy to change the practice of filling out skeletal reports.229 
One might respond that such a change in judicial attitude and 
evidentiary approach to minimalist police reports would just give police 
officers more incentive to falsify details on police reports, rather than omit 
them. This author would argue, however, that wholecloth falsification 
would be a highly unlikely response to this change in judicial practice. 
Police gain information from only certain categories of sources-citizen 
witnesses, brother officers, radio transmissions, the suspect's own words, 
and the officer's own observations. Short of an organized conspiracy of 
falsification from the very start of an inve~tigation,"~ there are inherent 
checks on an officer's ability to fabricate factual details from the start. 
These checks include the facts themselves and their sources as they 
develop. If the officer's account of events recorded in reports generated 
shortly after an arrest differs from statements of other witnesses, other 
police reports from brother officers, recorded radio transmissions, defense 
investigations, and the like, such contradictions will have their own 
significant impeachment value later on at hearings and trial.u' At the 
time when a police officer prepares documents shortly after arresting a 
suspect, he cannot be sure whether another set of facts, witnesses, or 
229. Professor Fisher is more dubious of the judiciary's ability on a case-by-case basis to 
effect the incidence of reportilying. See Fisher, supra note 19, at 50-51. He predicts that the 
courts would get tangled up in matters of materiality, prejudice, and police culpability regarding 
missing facts, then what sanctions to impose, and who would bear the ultimate burden of proof. 
See id. He is more hopeful regarding administrative changes. See id. 
230. See, e.g., JONATHAN RUBINSTEIN, CITY POLICE 43 (1973) (describing the drafting 
of false search warrants as a group enterprise). 
231. Professor Fisher touches on this issue of the timing of reports and the potential for 
contradiction and impeachment. See Fisher, supra note 19, at 12. 
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reports will come to light, describing the same incident that he is misrepre- 
senting in his report. In addition, if the police officer lies regarding his 
own observations or fabricates a suspect's inculpatory statements, without 
corroboration and without witnesses, his account will carry diminished 
weight. For instance, dropsy narratives, without corroboration, have 
become highly suspect.232 Defendant's unsigned and untaped confes- 
sions, again without corroboration, are vulnerable as well.233 Proof of 
out-and-out falsification of police documents can cost an officer his job, his 
pension, and might subject him to both criminal prosecution234 and civil 
liability."5 Whereas a more vigilant judicial attitude regarding omissions 
on reports might stimulate some officers to falsify reports, the substantial 
costs suffered for more extensive falsification and the likelihood of getting 
caught would deter most officers so inclined. 
B. Adverse Inferences for Omitted Facts 
Judges can go further than just permitting impeachment by omission. 
Should the court find that a police report is absent of an important 
inculpatory fact that is now being magically recalled by the officer in his 
in-court testimony, the court can instruct a trial jury to consider (or 
consider in its own fact-finding) an adverse inference by virtue of that 
absence. The court could charge the jury (or consider in its own review) 
that the fact that a particular important inculpatory fact testified to by the 
police witness is not present in that officer's report-but should naturally 
have been present-permits the trier of fact to infer that if there had been 
a reference to the matter in that report, such documentary reference would 
have contradicted rather than supported his testimony.236 The adverse 
inference so instructed or considered, would create a significant deterrent 
to police testimony that strays significantly and materially from a bare- 
bones police report, and might deter such police reports in the first 
instance. 
232. See KORNBLUM, supra note 20, at 80-81 (stating that N.Y.C. police have begun to 
use fictitious informants because of judicial mistrust of "dropsy" testimony). 
233. See Young, supra note 22, at 462 n.207. 
234. See Fisher, supra note 19, at 9 n.36. 
235. See id. at 15. 
236. A familiar example of an adverse inference instruction is the "missing witness" 
charge. A missing witness charge states that because of the failure of one side to call a witness 
whose testimony might have been favorable to that side, the jury may infer that such witness' 
testimony-if heard-would have been adverse to that side. See, e.g., People v. Rodriguez, 
341 N.E.2d 231 (1975) (affirming a jury instruction that allowed the jury to consider the fact 
that the defendant failed to call his wife, who was a witness). 
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In addition, if the court should determine that an exculpatory fact 
known to the police witness was missing from a police report or from 
testimony, another adverse instruction could be considered or instructed. 
Prosecutors have  brad^^^' obligations, but police witnesses do not.u8 
An argument for extending Brady to the police as a due process right for 
criminal defendants is beyond the scope of this arti~le."~ However, if 
the court should find that exculpatory facts were intentionally excised from 
reports or testimony, the court could consider that omission as demonstrat- 
ing prima facie proof of adversariness, and therefore bias or self-interest, 
opening the door to impeachment by extrinsic evidencez4' and a finding 
that the police witness is interested as a matter of fact.241 
C. Expansion of Discovery and Expansion of Cross-Eramination 
Upon a sufficient offer of proof, judges can permit discovery of other 
reports that would not ordinarily be discoverable under prevailing statutes 
and case For instance, if a police officer provided dropsy 
testimony or plain view facts in a pre-trial suppression hearing that was 
contradicted or cast into doubt by other evidence or offers of proof, the 
court could require that the other police reports and sworn testimony 
generated previously by that same officer in similar cases (for example, 
narcotics cases, contraband cases, weapons possessions cases) be pro- 
237. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
238. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 
(1984); Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988). 
239. But see Note, Toward a Constitutional Right to An Adequate Police Investigation: 
A Step Beyond Brady, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 835 (1975). 
240. See generally Chin & Wells, supra note 7. 
241. See People v. Bowden, 198 A.D.2d 39 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993); see generally 
Uviller, supra note 178, at 813-15. 
242. Police personnel files including police reports of prior incidents have been held to 
be discoverable in cases where the defendant is accused of violence against a police officer and 
the defendant is asserting self-defense. See, e.g., M. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 
144 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1977) (requiring dismissal when the court did not get the State to produce 
documents and the claim ofprivilege has been overruled). Police personnel files have been held 
to be properly discoverable for an in camera inspection to find impeachment material in non- 
violent criminal cases. See, e.g.. United States v. Kiszewski, 877 F.2d 210 (2nd Cir. 1989) 
(requiring the government to produce a file for an in camera review in an extortion 
prosecution); People v. Herrera, 499 N.Y.S.2d 311 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (bribery prosecution). 
Police personnel files, on occasion, have been held to be directly discoverable to the defense 
in non-violent felony cases. See People v. Puglisi, 376 N.E.2d 1325 (N.Y. 1978) (finding 
harmful error in a narcotics case where the government refused to disclose information from 
a police officer's personnel file to the defendant for impeachment purposes); People v. Sumpter, 
347 N.Y.S.2d 670 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973) (holding that where a police officer testifies, the 
prosecution has a duty to make available to the court any information affecting the defendant's 
guilt including evidence that affects the credibility of the police officer). 
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duced-either in camera or directly to the defense-to show a pattern. If 
it became apparent through admission into evidence of other reports that 
this particular officer was always arresting 1) people who had mysteriously 
dropped their narcotics in front of him without provocation, or 2) drivers 
who kept their weapons unconcealed in plain sight on the passenger seats 
of their cars, then that pattern of dubious police reporting or testimony 
could be factored into the court's evaluation of the officer's testimony in 
the instant case.243 
In this way, expanding the scope of discovery and cross-examination 
regarding police reports and prior testimonies would serve to eliminate 
much of the silent presumption of reliability that police witnesses enjoy. 
In regards to some of Professor Cloud's reasons why judges accept 
perjured police testimony, such expanded discovery and cross-examination 
would make it much easier for a judge to determine whether a witness was 
lying, and particularly the experienced police witness who has mastered the 
art of testimonial demean~r.~"" 
D. The Swearing Contest and the "Interested" Wtness 
Expanded discovery and cross-examination would put the police 
witness on a more level playing field with the defendant in a swearing 
contest. A defendant is at a distinct disadvantage when taking the stand, 
whether at a hearing or at trial. The defendant's criminal record is 
generally known to the judge-as-factfinder. No special attempt has to be 
made by the prosecution to discover the defendant's rap-sheet-it's usually 
part of the court file from arraignment forward.245 Rarely does a trial or 
243. Judge Younger's own mistrust of dropsy testimony was caused by his witnessing 
"case after case in which a policeman testifies that the defendant dropped the narcotics on the 
ground, whereupon the policeman arrested him. Usually the very language of the testimony 
is identical from one case to another." Younger, supra note 8, at 596-97. In other words, the 
verbatim repetition itself gave rise to the suspicion that the testimony was tailored and 
perjurious. 
244. Obviously, such expanded discovery would not make it easier on the police 
department and the prosecution, who, upon court order, would have to deliver up the police 
witness' prior police reports and testimony in otherwise unrelated cases. Both prosecutors and 
the department would argue that such discovery was both unduly burdensome and overbroad. 
On the other hand, many police departments voluntarily take on the burden of creating a double 
file system to avoid discovery. See, e.g., Palmer v. City of Chicago, 755 F.2d 560, 569 (7th 
Cir. 1985). As to being overbroad, the court's discovery order could be narrowed to matters 
of sufficient similarity, with a provision for in camera inspection to avoid a fishing expedition 
and undue prejudice to the prosecution. 
245. New York Code of Criminal Procedure provides pre-trial bail criteria that applies to 
initial bail determination at arraignment. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. 5 510.30(2)(a) (McKinney 1995). 
One of the criteria is the defendant's criminal record, thereby made available to the court, the 
People, and the defendant in their respective files. 
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hearing judge seek to insulate herself from that information in order to be 
scrupulously fair to the defendant. Rather, the judge-as-factfinder asserts 
that she is fully capable of considering the facts of the case without regard 
to irrelevant or unduly prejudicial matters. However, even when prior 
convictions as relevant to credibility or character are not raised during 
examination of the defendant witness, the judge-as-fact-finder is not going 
to be able to easily discount the defendant's past when evaluating the 
defendant's present reliability under oath. Prior convictions have been 
deemed relevant to credibility in the broadest possible terms-as showing 
that the defendant will place his own interest above that of society's.24G 
A judge-as-factfinder who subscribes to this broad theory of relevance will 
no doubt evaluate the defendant's credibility through the clouded lens of his 
criminal history, regardless of the judge's confident pronouncements to the 
contrary. 
More importantly, any judge-as-factfinder will view the defendant 
witness as an interested witness.247 Standard criminal jury instructions 
charge that a defendant who testifies is an interested witness as a matter of 
law.248 'Whereas being an interested witness does not render dl testimo- 
ny unworthy of belief,249 there is no doubt it creates a tacit presumption 
of unreliability, particularly when set against the credibility of a police 
witness, who enjoys (de facto) a silent presumption of reliability. 
Expanding the scope of discovery and cross-examination to include 
past police reports, testimony, and permitting a thorough litigation of 
minimalist or falsified police documents may reveal a pattern of police 
misconduct or false reporting that could show that a police witness will 
place his own interest (or the interest of making an arrest) above that of 
society's (or at least above the law). A deeper scrutiny of police testimony 
and conduct might demonstrate that a police witness is an interested 
witness, not as a matter of law but as a matter of fact. Whether to meet 
an arrest quota or earn recognition, promotion, overtime pay, or some 
other reward, a pattern of misconduct and deceit might prove that a police 
witness is self-interested in the arrest, prosecution, and conviction of this 
(or any) defendant. At the very least, such a pattern could prove that the 
police witness is partial in his testimony, and therefore such bias serves to 
rebut any unstated presumption of credibility. 
246. See, e.g., People v. McClainin, 178 A.D.2d 495, 496 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991). 
247. See People v. Bowden, 198 A.D.2d 39 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993); see generally 
Uviller, supra note 178, at 813-15. 
248. See, e.g., N.Y. 1 Criminal Jury Instructions (CJI) 7.03. 
249. See People v. Winston, 52 A.D.2d 432,384 N.Y.S.2d 457 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976). 
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E. Police Oflcers as Expert or De Facto Expert Witnesses 
When the prosecution seeks to use police witness testimony to convey 
specialized knowledge, technical expertise or other kinds of opinion 
testimony to the trier of fact without having sought qualification of the 
witness as an expert, judges should nevertheless permit expanded discovery 
and cross-examination of the police witness as if he were an expert. This 
would protect against the police witness who injects unsubstantiated or 
highly prejudicial characterizations into criminal trials. Such characteriza- 
tions and conclusions are not intentional falsehoods, per se, but may not 
prove to be reliable testimony unless subject to the rigors of pre-trial 
disclosure and effective cross-examination. 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 permits admission of expert testimony 
of a scientific, technical, or other specialized nature which will "assist the 
trier of fact" to understand evidence or to determine a fact in issue.=' 
Rule 701 of the Federal Rules allows nonexpert witnesses to provide 
opinion testimony when, as matter of practical necessity, events which they 
have personally observed cannot otherwise be fully presented to the court 
or jury. Police officers often testify as experts, that is, as witnesses 
deemed qualified to convey specialized or technical knowledge in the form 
of an opinion to help the trier of fact understand evidence and issues in 
criminal trials.=* However, police officers more often testify without 
such qualification from the court, describing events which they have 
personally observed presented in the form of lay opinion testimony. 
Yet even when testifying without having been qualified as an expert, 
a police witness enjoys many of the advantages of a qualified expert 
witness. The court is fully aware of that, and will instruct the jury to 
consider a police officer's testimony as no more credible or less credible 
250. FED. R. EVID. 702. This rule states: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact 
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto 
in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
Id. 
251. See FED. R. EVID. 701. This rule states: 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of 
opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) 
rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear 
understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. 
Id. 
252. See, e.g., People v. Rivera, 209 A.D.2d 151 (A.D.C. 1994) (limiting expert 
testimony regarding behavior patterns of dmg dealers to explain absence of pre-recorded buy 
money was proper); United States v. Johnson, 527 F.2d 1381 @.C. Cir. 1976) (admitting 
expert opinion by police detective that 26 packets of heroin and 35 tablets of preludin indicated 
that defendant was a dealer). 
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than any other witness.253 The court is also fully aware of how futile 
such an instruction proves to be in addressing the reality that police witness 
testimony is inherently different than other kinds of lay testimony. 
The police witness is almost always testifying as a "professional," that 
is, someone deemed to be a trained observer, a trained investigator, trained 
in the law, trained in enforcement techniques, even trained in testifying, 
More importantly, the very matters about which the officer testifies are 
likely to be within the ambit of his profession. He will testify regarding 
what he heard from witnesses as a trained investigator. He will testify 
about what he saw with the keen powers of the trained observer. He will 
testify regarding what judgments he made and what actions he took as a 
person trained in law enforcement. He will testify about how he vouchered 
evidence, filled out his reports, and so on-all drawing on his expertise and 
years of practice, though without express qualification from the court. He 
will testify with an official imprimatur of sorts, since he testifies subject to 
two oaths-the oath sworn as a witness to tell the whole truth, and the oath 
he takes as a police officer to serve, protect and defend the public and the 
law. 
In presenting the police witness to the trier of fact as a lay witness, the 
prosecutor will also introduce the police witness as a law enforcement 
professional. Preliminary direct examination will provide basic pedigree 
information regarding the witness' command, how many years he has been 
on the force, what special duties he had at the time and place of occur- 
rence, his specialized training, and so on.254 In addition, the officer will 
draw upon characterizations and conclusions in testimony that necessarily 
derive from his expertise, for example, that the particular comer observed 
was a highcrime area;'" that the movements of the suspects prompted an 
articulable suspicion that they were casing the store for a burglary or rob- 
b e r ~ ; ~ ~  that a particular bulge in a suspect's pocket felt during a police 
patdown indicated the presence of c~ntraband,~' and so on. Courts 
permit this kind of testimony from police witnesses, with the inevitable 
conclusions and opinions contained within the testimony, even when not 
actually qualified as experts. 
The effect of this sort of de facto expert testimony is that unqualified 
police witnesses have great advantages in being able to convey opinion 
253. See N.Y. 1 CJI 7.08; People v. Lopez, 190 A.D.2d 866 (2nd Dept. 1993). 
254. See GARY MULDOON & SANDRA FEUERSTEIN, HANDLING A CRIMINAL CASE IN NEVI 
YORK 18 (1995) ("For a police witness, the examination will likely begin with questions 
regarding the officer's title, experience, work area and assignment, and how the officer's duties 
brought herhim to the scene."). 
255. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972). 
256. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 6 (1968). 
257. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993). 
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testimony of a technical and specialized nature in the guise of lay fact and 
opinion testimony. The practical advantages to the witness and the 
prosecution are substantial. First of all, a party can ordinarily challenge 
any witness7 qualifications to take the stand as an expert and give opinion 
testimony.258 However, regarding a lay police witness who has personal 
observations to relate, the defense cannot ordinarily challenge the witness' 
qualifications to testify. Secondly, a lay police witness can easily inject 
characterizations and opinion into personal observation testimony.259 
Such characterizations are part of everyday police argot-for example, 
calling the subject of an arrest the "perpetrator," describing the complain- 
ant as the "victim," characterizing a third party as an "accomplice," 
"partner," "lookout," "steerer," and so forth. Some of these characteriza- 
tions, interpolated into personal observation testimony, prove to be very 
prejudicial to the accused and may prove to be unreliable. Nevertheless, 
courts will generally permit such opinion testimony under the Federal 
Rules of Evidence 701 as being of practical necessity in order to convey 
admissible personal ~bservations.~~' Police officers are trained to testify 
in this manner, injecting prejudicial opinion that does significant damage 
to the defense. 
Lastly, the limits and scope of all testimony rest in the sound 
discretion of the court. Therefore, a judge is relatively free to permit the 
injection of such opinion, conclusions, and even hearsay into lay personal 
observation testimony, subject to reversal on appeal only for an abuse of 
judicial dis~retion.~' A judge who is predisposed to accredit police 
testimony is likely to give the police witness a great deal of latitude here. 
Rarely does that enlarged testimonial scope result in reversal of a criminal 
conviction.262 
Accordingly, subject to a proper offer of proof demonstrating that the 
officer's proffered statement is de facto expert testimony, the court should 
permit discovery and cross-examination of the basis of such opinion 
testimony including facts and data underlying such opinion. This would 
include treatises, training materials, patrol guides, and police reports and 
documents upon which the police witness is basing his reasoning and 
conc l~s ions .~~  The Federal Rules of Evidence permits such extensive 
258. See MCCORMICK, supra note 176, at $ 13. 
259. See FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee notes ("the practical impossibility of 
determining by rule what is a 'fact,' demonstrated by a century of litigation of the question of 
what is a fact for purposes of pleading under the Field Code, extends into evidence also.") 
(citation omitted); see also MCCORMICK, supra note 176, at § 11. 
260. See FED. R. EVID. 701. 
261. See text accompanying supra notes 62-63. 
262. See id. 
263. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 702; FED. R. EVID. 703; FED. R. EVID. 705. 
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discovery and cross-examination for experts, and requires such disclosure 
upon examination. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for 
substantial pre-trial discovery of an expert's basis for his opinion.264 The 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide the cross-examiner with 
advance disclosure of the results of examinations and tests on which the 
expert relies.265 However defense counsel in federal criminal cases 
ordinarily learn of the expert's other statements only after the expert has 
testified on direct examination at trial.266 Both civil and criminal case 
law give the judge inherent discretionary power to require preliminary 
disclosure of the basis for an expert's opinion testimony.267 That same 
discretionary power to require early discovery, expanded discovery, and 
cross-examination of experts should be extended to de facto experts such 
as police witnesses who insist on injecting prejudicial opinion and 
conclusions into lay personal observation testimony. 
Trial judges often conduct preliminary voir dire inquiry outside the 
presence of the jury of opinion witnesses before qualifying them as 
The same voir dire procedure would serve for de facto expert 
police witnesses as well. The voir dire determination would not necessarily 
serve to qualify or disqualify the witness, but serve to qualify or disqualify 
certain kinds of unsubstantiated or unreliable or highly prejudicial (while 
minimally probative) opinion testimony before the jury hears it. Again, 
the court already is comfortable in conducting such inquiries of expert 
witnesses. Expanding the use of voir dire to de facto experts would not be 
asking the court to do something alien to its own sense of process, and 
would likely deter the injection of unreliable and unduly prejudical police 
testimony in the guise of an account by a witness of his own personal 
observations. 
V. Conclusion 
A factfinding judge who knowingly harbors a presumption in favor of 
police testimony, and who views defendant testimony as inherently tainted 
by self-interest and criminal propensity will always find facts favoring the 
prosecution. In other words, a judge who purposefully weighs facts with 
her thumb on the scale will never be a fair arbiter of the facts. However, 
264. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4). 
265. See FED. R. CNM. P. 16(a)(l)@); FED. R. C ~ l h f .  P. 16(b)(l)(B). 
266. See FED. R. CRIM.  PRO. 26.2. 
267. See generally Michael H .  Graham, Expert Witness Testimony and the Federal Rules 
of Evidence: Insuring AdequateAssurance of Trusfivorthiness, 1986 U .  ILL. L. REV. 43 (1986). 
268. See FED. R. EVID. 104(~). 
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a judge who unintentionally but characteristically avoids confronting the 
issue of police lying can remedy some of the problem by expanding the 
scope of discovery, cross-examination, and consideration. By that, the 
judge can raise the issue of credibility to its proper position of importance. 
An important consequence of the expansion of proper discovery and 
cross-examination is the political cover that it would provide judges. If 
past police reports or testimony show a pattern of deceit or impropriety, 
the judge can rule unfavorably for the prosecution and properly shift the 
blame squarely to the police officer. The judge thereby avoids the most 
politically damaging allegations-that she is soft on crime, that she let a 
defendant off on a technicality, or that she allowed a runaway jury to 
deliver a wrong-headed verdict. A judge who is unaccepting of perjurious 
police testimony cannot be deemed soft on crime, just even-handed as to 
which crimes she will not tolerate. Neither is the inadmissibility of 
dishonesty, and particularly lying under oath, a technicality. A fair justice 
system worthy of respect is premised on credible testimonial evidence 
subject to the test of truth. A judge who finds, based on the evidence, that 
a police witness is in part or on the whole unworthy of belief, or who 
instructs a jury to properly weigh the credibility of a police witness based 
on an expanded record, will not be politically vulnerable. Political 
vulnerability comes when a judge rules against the prosecution with 
insufficient factual basis or premised on unpopular (and often misunder- 
stood) legal doctrines. With a sufficient evidentiary basis, the public, the 
press, and the party leaders will understand the unacceptability of lying and 
official misconduct. With that, some proper balance and integrity will be 
restored to the system. 
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